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ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING:
LEGAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO
TREATMENT FOR SUBSTANCE
MISUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS
RICHARD C. BOLDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The April 15, 2011 Roundtable Conference on Adolescent Decision-Making,
sponsored by the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law's Law
and Health Care Program and the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics,
included a panel on decision making in the context of treatment for substance use
disorders and other mental health treatment.' The panel was organized around two
case studies. The first involves Denise, a sixteen-year-old high school student, who
has received an assessment and initial treatment at a residential drug treatment
program for heroin use. Denise wants to leave the program against medical advice
and her mother's wishes. This case study squarely presents the question of how
decision-making authority with respect to substance misuse treatment for
adolescents is allocated within a family, particularly when the adolescent patient is
at odds with his or her parent or legal guardian2 over whether to participate in
treatment.
According to the brief history provided in the first scenario, Denise joined her
mother in making the decision to enter the residential treatment program. Denise
was initially motivated to seek treatment because one of her friends had suffered a
severe health crisis as a result of using heroin. This distinguishes her case from that
of many others who are required to undergo substance misuse treatment as a
Copyright 0 2012 by Richard C. Boldt.
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I thank Eileen Canfield
and Ellen Weber for their comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Leslie Meltzer Henry for
helping me frame the analysis contained in this work. Thanks also to Jasmine C. Foreman, Marshall E.
Jackson, Jr., and Anna Johnston for their careful research assistance. This project was supported by a
research grant from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. Conferences & Symposia: Roundrable on Adolescent Decision-Making, UNIV. OF MD FRANCIS
KING CAREY SCHOOL OF LAw, http://www.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/detail.html?conf-108
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
2. Throughout this essay, references to an adolescent's "parent" or "parents" are meant to include
his or her legal guardian as well.
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consequence of their involvement in either the criminal justice or juvenile justice
systems.3
The second case study involves Steve, a fourteen-year-old who uses alcohol
and marijuana without his parents' knowledge. In this scenario, Steve is receiving
outpatient treatment for his substance use, but has refused to permit his counselors
to share information with his parents about his alcohol and other drug use or his
treatment. While the treatment providers have concluded that the parents'
involvement in a family counseling process could aid Steve's therapeutic progress,
Steve is reluctant to consent to the disclosure of this information to his parents
because of his father's intolerant attitude toward the use of alcohol and other drugs.
This case study presents difficult questions about confidentiality and medical
privacy, even between family members, in the context of substance misuse
treatment and, by extension, within the field of mental health treatment more
broadly.
The first section of this article examines the central question, presented by the
case study of Denise, of how decision-making authority with respect to treatment
for substance misuse is (or should be) organized within the triad made up of an
adolescent patient, his or her parents, and a treatment provider.4 Subsumed within
this discussion is a consideration of the respective capacity of adolescents and their
parents both to grant and to withhold consent for treatment.5 The following section
then takes up a related set of questions concerning a treatment provider's disclosure
of confidential information about an adolescent's diagnosis and/or treatment for
substance misuse to the adolescent's parents. 6 This discussion, although prompted
by the second case study, is related to a larger analysis of decision making, because
communication with an adolescent's parents for purposes of arranging informed
consent for treatment may itself constitute a legally prohibited disclosure of
confidential information.'
The article concludes by suggesting that adolescents' rights should be
safeguarded in those situations in which the law treats them as the ultimate
decision-maker.8 When the law does not permit adolescents to exercise independent
3. See Randolph Muck et al., An Overview of the Effectiveness of Adolescent Substance Abuse
Treatment Models, 33 YOUTH & Soc'Y 143, 145 (2001) (explaining that adolescents in treatment for
substance misuse "are typically referred by a parent, juvenile justice system official .... school official,
child welfare worker, or representative of some other community institution").
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part Ill.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006) (prohibiting the disclosure, under most circumstances, of
information about an individual's identity, diagnosis or prognosis maintained "in connection with the
performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training,
treatment, rehabilitation or research . . ."); 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(C)(2) (2010) (governing federal
confidentiality protections for minors who seek or receive substance misuse treatment); see also infra
Part Ill.
8. See infra Part IV.
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and final authority, however, parents and clinicians should still seek to structure
opportunities for adolescents to participate in the decision-making process, while
openly acknowledging the limits of that participation.9 In the end, tensions in the
law between according decision-making authority to adolescents for some purposes
and withholding it for others are likely to be managed best in practice rather than
resolved in advance on the basis of abstract legal analysis.o This process of
working out the sometimes competing interests of adolescents and their families,
both with respect to making treatment decisions and managing confidential
information, requires sensitive contextualized judgments by treatment professionals
and others concerned about the wellbeing of minors with substance misuse
disorders and other mental disabilities." Legal rules have an important role to play
in framing the decision-making processes by which these choices are made by and
on behalf of adolescents, but ultimately, the outcomes in individual cases are just as
likely to be driven by clinical and interpersonal considerations that require sensitive
attention to the individual circumstances presented by each adolescent in need of
treatment services.12
II. THE ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY BETWEEN PARENTS AND
CHILDREN
The basic legal framework for determining the allocation of authority
between adolescents and their parents with respect to health-care decisions,
including decisions regarding treatment for mental illness and alcohol and other
drug use disorders, rests on two fundamental foundations.' 3 The first is the doctrine
of informed consent, which is a central organizing feature of virtually all
relationships between health-care providers and the recipients of their services.14
The second is made up of the constitutional principles that define the essential
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical Decision-
Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 451 (2002).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part IV; see also Linda L. Caldwell et al., A Person-Centered Approach to
Individualizing a School-Based Universal Prevention Intervention, 35 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE
214, 214, 218 (2009) (advocating for an individualized assessment of adolescents in the early stages of
intervention).
13. See generally Tara L. Kuther, Medical Decision-Making and Minors: Issues of Consent and
Assent, 38 ADOLESCENCE 343, 344 (2003) (noting the importance of informed consent as a bedrock
legal and moral responsibility of health-care providers); Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed
Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 147-49
(2000) (outlining the development of minors' limited constitutional rights to participate in health-care
decision making).
14. See JON R. WALTZ & FRED E. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 152, 164-65 (1971)
(explaining how the requirement of informed consent defines the communicative duties of a physician);
see also Timothy J. Paterick et al., Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for Physicians,
83 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 313, 313 (2008) (noting that "informed consent is ethically, morally, and
legally" part of the doctor-patient relationship).
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rights of parents and their children in the field of medical decision making.' 5 Even
though each state has a statutory overlay that builds upon and, in some cases,
modifies this basic framework,16 it is important to start at the foundations of the
system.
The doctrine of informed consent, although of ancient origin,' 7 really only
came to apply to the treatment of persons with mental disabilities beginning in the
1960s, with the Kansas case Natanson v. Kline'8 and the Missouri case Mitchell v.
Robinson.'9 The doctrine has two components: a duty of disclosure and a duty to
obtain a patient's agreement to undergo treatment based upon his or her
understanding of the information that has been conveyed. 20 As with informed
consent doctrine generally, the law requires a provider of mental health treatment to
disclose essential information about the costs and benefits of a proposed therapeutic
intervention and to ascertain the patient's assent in light of that information. 21 In
Mitchell, which involved a claim that a physician had failed to disclose the risks
associated with electro-shock therapy, the court held that a "doctor owes a duty to
15. See generally Schlam & Wood, supra note 13, at 147-49 (stating that parents' rights to care for
their children often supersede children's rights to due process and privacy). The rights of minors have
been limited by the Supreme Court's recognition of the interests of parents and the state in the
upbringing and welfare of children. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977)
(noting that while the Constitution protects both minors and adults alike, the state's ability to "control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults") (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
16. See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for Mental
Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 712 (1993) (describing state statutes providing for
mature minor and emancipation exceptions); Tori Lallemont et al., Decision-Making Authority and
Substance Abuse Treatment for Adolescents. A Survey of State Laws, 44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 323
(2009) (identifying and classifying state laws governing the provision of voluntary inpatient substance
misuse treatment for adolescents); see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-307(l) (2011) (requiring the
patient's parent or legal guardian to apply for voluntary substance abuse treatment if the patient in
question is a minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.601(4)(a) (West 2011) (authorizing minors to consent to
voluntary substance abuse treatment services from a licensed provider).
17. RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 61-63 (1986)
(setting out a history of informed consent).
18. 350 P.2d 1093, 1104-06 (Kan. 1960) (agreeing with Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. Of
Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), which stated that a physician must "recognize
that each patient presents a separate problem . . . and that in discussing the element of risk a certain
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent").
19. 334 S.W.2d. I1, 19 (Mo. 1960) (holding that informed consent was required in the treatment of
a person with an "emotional illness" while the patient was lucid), abrogated in part by Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
20. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 258 (5th ed. 2009).
21. See Mitchell, 334 S.W.2d at 18 (holding that a patient suffering from an "emotional illness"
should have been informed about the risks associated with electro-shock therapy); see also SLOBOGIN ET
AL., supra note 20, at 258-59, 284, 290 (noting the recent trend of states extending informed consent
doctrine into fields such as psychotherapy).
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his patient to make reasonable disclosure of all significant facts .. . a doctor who
fails to perform this duty is guilty of malpractice." 22
For a number of years, the doctrine was limited to mental health treatments
other than psychotherapy, especially psychosurgery, pharmacotherapy and other
"physically intrusive treatment modalities." 23 In part, this limitation was a product
of the relationship between the doctrine of informed consent and the rules
governing tort damages. 24 Traditionally, a tort recovery required the plaintiff
patient to show that he or she had suffered a physical injury as a consequence of the
health-care provider's negligence. 25 As jurisdictions increasingly have come to
recognize a right to compensation for non-physical injuries, 26 the application of the
doctrine of informed consent has spread to forms of treatment (i.e., talking
therapies) whose risks are primarily non-physical in nature. 27 Wholly apart from its
connection to the law of torts, however, the doctrine of informed consent has also
evolved as more clearly articulated notions of patient autonomy have helped to
reshape the ethical responsibilities of health-care providers. 28 From this
perspective, the obligation of physicians and other care providers to insure that
recipients of services understand the costs and benefits of undergoing treatment,
and have given their assent in light of that understanding, is as much an obligation
of professional ethics as it is of the law governing liability for physical harms. 29
In most states, if a patient's mental illness or other mental disability precludes
the giving of informed consent, non-emergency treatment cannot be administered
without a judicial determination of legal incompetency and the appointment of a
22. Mitchell, 334 S.W.2d at 18 (quoting Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for
Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 427 (1957)).
23. SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 258-59.
24. Id. at 259.
25. Id. Alternatively, a cause of action could be based on a claim of assault or battery, depending on
the jurisdiction's theory of liability. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914) (describing an operation without the patient's consent as an assault, for which the physician was
liable for damages).
26. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140-52 (1992) (discussing the
development of various compensable non-physical harms that have arisen in tort law).
27. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Informed Consent to Psychotherapy: Recent Developments, 48
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 445, 445-46 (1997) (describing the developing application of the informed
consent doctrine to psychotherapy and arguing for its increased use); see also Suzanne W. Hadley &
Hans H. Strupp, Contemporary Views of Negative Effects in Psychotherapy, 33 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1291, 1293-94 (1976) (providing primarily non-physical examples of the potential harms
that can result from psychotherapy).
28. See Benjamin Freedman, A Moral Theory of Informed Consent, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32,
32-35 (1975) (discussing the ethics of informed consent in the medical profession and the personal
autonomy interests associated with an individual's right to be informed about the risks and benefits of a
medical procedure).
29. Id. at 32.
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guardian or other legal representative. 30 Adolescents and other minors, however,
need not be adjudicated incompetent on an individual basis, and instead are treated
systematically in the law as incompetent for a variety of legal purposes, 3 including
the capacity to give informed consent for most kinds of medical care. 32 For this
reason, the principal medical decision-maker for adolescents for most purposes is
the adolescent's parent.33
A. The Balance ofInterests With Respect to Treatment of Children with Mental
Illness
These background principles came together in 1979 in a U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Parham v. JR.. et al.,34 in which a class of minors challenged, on due
process grounds, the right of their parents to authorize their "voluntary" psychiatric
hospitalization without a prior judicial determination or other adversary
proceeding.35 In his opinion for a majority of the court, Chief Justice Burger wrote
at length about the "family as a unit" and about the law's understanding of parental
decision making in cases in which the judgment of a parent is at odds with the
wishes of an adolescent. 36 The Chief Justice explained that:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.37
In light of the Parham majority's presumption that parents ordinarily act in
their child's best interests,38 it is worth exploring the nature of the various kinds of
interests held by children that may be at stake in health-care decisions, including
30. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to
Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 107 (1995). A severe mental illness or other mental disability
may disrupt either or both of the components of informed consent. See id. at 108-11 (identifying legal
factors for evaluating the competence of mentally disabled patients to understand their options and
communicate their decisions). The range of impairments a court could consider includes an individual's
inability: (1) to evidence a choice; (2) to understand relevant information; (3) to harbor no clearly false
beliefs with respect to information relevant to the choice; (4) to rationally manipulate and/or appreciate
that information; or (5) to reach a reasonable outcome. Id.
31. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221, 226-27 (1995) (describing how the theory of adolescents' lack of "capacity
for understanding and reasoning" motivates the paternalistic limits on their autonomy in various
contexts, including juvenile justice, contract law, education, marriage and employment).
32. Id at 227.
33. Schlam & Wood, supra note 13, at 148-49.
34. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
35. Id. at 587-88.
36. Id at 598-617.
37. Id at 602.
38. Id.
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decisions about whether to consent to treatment for substance misuse or other
mental disabilities. John Eekelaar has identified three categories of interests held by
children.39 The first category covers "basic interests," which are interests relating to
a child's general physical, emotional and intellectual wellbeing. 40 The second
category is comprised of "developmental interests." 4 1 Child care-givers concerned
especially with developmental interests make choices designed to equip children
during their early years with the tools they will need to succeed later in life, to
insure that children's "capacities . .. [are] developed to their best advantage," and
to minimize "avoidable prejudices incurred during childhood." 42 The third category
of interests is made up of "autonomy interests." 43 According to Eekelaar, these
interests involve the freedom to select lifestyles and relationships according to the
child's preferences.44
With respect to medical decision making, these distinct interest domains may
be aligned or they may come into conflict.4 5 When the interest categories are in
conflict, parents and other adult decision-makers may weigh them differently than
the adolescents who are subject to their judgments.46 Thus, basic and
developmental interests often are valued most by parents, 47 while autonomy
interests frequently are more important in the decision-making calculations of
adolescents.48
While Chief Justice Burger recognized the potential for parental abuse in the
exercise of decision-making discretion,49 his opinion did not unpack the more
subtle ways in which the distinct components of a child's interests might come into
conflict even when a parent seeks to act in good faith.50 Given his view that
parents' "natural bonds of affection" generally lead them to make good choices,5
the Chief Justice adopted a position of deference with respect to evaluating (or
39. John Eekelaar, The Emergence ofChildren's Rights, 6 O.J.L.S. 161, 170-71 (1986).
40. Id. at 170.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 170-71.
43. Id. at 171.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 171 (noting that a child's autonomy interest may conflict with his or her developmental or
basic interests).
46. See id. (stating that adults are likely to value basic and developmental interests more than
autonomy interests, which children are likely to value more highly).
4 7. Id.
48. See id. at 170-71, 177 (noting that autonomy interests may be especially important to children).
49. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
50. Compare id at 598-604 (discussing the interests of children and those of their parents), with
Eekelaar, supra note 39, at 170-72 (acknowledging the three interests of children, developmental, basic
and autonomy interests, often are at odds).
51. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
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second guessing) the decision of parents to hospitalize their children for mental
health treatment.52 He explained:
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality
may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of
child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some parents "may
at times be acting against the interests of their children" . . . creates a
basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those
pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in
the child's best interests. The statist notion that government power
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.53
To be sure, Chief Justice Burger's analysis did acknowledge that "parents
cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to have
a child institutionalized," given the child's liberty interests and the nature of the
decision to approve psychiatric treatment. 54 Instead, the Parham court recognized
that parents' "plenary authority to seek such care for their children," must be
"subject to a physician's independent examination and medical judgment."55
The Chief Justice's analysis was framed by the due process balancing test the
Court previously had set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.56 On one side of that
constitutional balance is the "private interest that will be affected by the official
action."" Of course, on the facts of Parham, and in other cases in which a parent
seeks to authorize health care for a child in the face of that child's resistance, the
private interests are not necessarily unitary, but can be understood as residing both
with the child and with his or her parents.58 In the context of the medical decision
in Parham-hospitalization for treatment for mental illness-Chief Justice Burger
52. Id. at 602-03. Chief Justice Burger is not alone in taking the position that parents' deep
emotional bonds and superior knowledge about their children make them the most appropriate primary
decision-makers for purposes of health care choices. See, e.g., James Rachels, Morality, Parents, and
Children, in PERSON TO PERSON 46, 53 (George Graham & Hugh LaFolette eds., 1989) ("[ P]arents are
assigned special responsibility for their own children because parents are better situated to look after
their own."). The European Court of Human Rights has also held that a parent's voluntary admission of
a twelve-year-old boy to a psychiatric hospital, against the wishes of the boy, was not a deprivation of
liberty contrary to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because the parent was
exercising her parental decision-making authority in the child's best interests. Nielsen v. Denmark, 144
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
53. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977)) (citation omitted).
54. Id at 604.
55. Id.
56. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (noting the three interests that must be balanced to insure due
process of the law).
57. Id. at 335.
58. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600; see also R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C., 572 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala.
1990) (explaining that while a child has a substantial liberty interest, parents also have a "legal duty of
providing medical attention for their children").
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acknowledged that the child has a substantial liberty interest in "not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment." 9 In addition, he conceded that the "child has
a protectable interest" in avoiding the stigma associated with mental illness and
with "being labeled erroneously," 60 although the Chief Justice suggested that a
voluntary hospitalization for mental health treatment authorized by a parent was
less likely to stigmatize the child than would an involuntary civil commitment or a
juvenile delinquency determination reached by a state actor.6 '
While the parent's interests were treated by Chief Justice Burger as largely
derivative of those held by the child, the Court's opinion does suggest a basis for
recognizing parental liberty interests that derive as well from the "family as a
unit." 62 These parental interests, Burger explained, could be undermined by a
constitutional rule requiring a pre-hospitalization judicial determination, because
such a process could create family discord and place unnecessary strain on the
parent-child relationship. 63 In a similar fashion, others who have explored these
issues also have suggested that, with respect to making health-care decisions for
their children, parents not only have rights "on behalf of their children, as proxy
decision-makers or legal representatives," but also possess rights "as parents
because of the importance of family integrity or family autonomy," and rights as
"those responsible for children."M
In his partial dissent in Parham, Justice Brennan, while acknowledging the
importance of the interests held by parents, described the child's interests as more
vulnerable and therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. 65 In the
context of in-patient mental health treatment, Justice Brennan noted that children
often are confined for a "longer period of time" than are adult patients, and may
suffer life-long "scars" as a consequence of the emotional toll and stigma
associated with commitment.66 He also stressed the uncertainty surrounding mental
illness diagnosis and treatment decisions, especially for adolescents and other
children, the tendency of clinicians to err on the side of medical caution, and the
resulting over-institutionalization of children as a broad statistical matter.67
59. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.
60. Id at 601.
61. Id. at 600-01.
62. Id. at 600, 602. Cf Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (noting that parents
have a right to decide how to nurture and educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400
(1923) (noting that a parent has a "natural duty" to insure that his or her child receives a suitable
education).
63. Parham, 442 U.S. at 634-35.
64. Moli Paul, Decision-Making About Children's Mental Health Care: Ethical Challenges, 10
ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 301, 303 (2004) (citation omitted).
65. Parham, 442 U.S. at 627-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 628 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 628-29.
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B. The Balance ofInterests With Respect to Treatment of Children for Substance
Use Disorders
The literature on treating adolescents with substance use disorders describes a
number of considerations that inform a similar analysis of these young patients'
interests. First, with respect to stigma and labeling, it is important to note that not
all adolescents who use alcohol and other drugs meet the diagnostic criteria for a
drug use disorder or are likely to develop a dependency or other persisting
disability.68 Pursuant to the disease model of alcoholism and other drug addiction
that has dominated thinking in this field since the middle of the twentieth century,
individuals who are diagnosed with a substance use disorder are thought to have an
"abnormal, constitutional disposition influenced by enduring biological factors"
that causes them to lose control over their drinking or other drug-taking behavior. 69
According to this "disease model," the disability, "although incurable, can be
suppressed through abstinence." 0 Because of the poor fit between the diagnostic
criteria for substance use disorders generally used for adults and actual patterns of
adolescent drug use,7 ' the American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP") has created an
alternative diagnostic system that sets out six stages of adolescent drug
involvement.72 In addition to the more severe stages of "abuse" and "dependence"
the AAP's typography also includes "experimental use" and "early abuse,"73
neither of which necessarily requires the sort of intensive interventions and life-
long abstinence ordinarily associated with treating drug use disorders according to
68. See Ken C. Winters, Treating Adolescents with Substance Use Disorders: An Overview of
Practice Issues and Treatment Outcome, 20 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 203, 204-05 (1999) (arguing that most
adolescents who use drugs do not become addicted).
69. Daniel W. Hungerford, Interventions in Trauma Centers /br Substance Use Disorders: New
Insights on an Old Malady, 59 J. TRAUMA S10, S10 -SI I (Supp. 2005).
70. Id. at S10.
71. See Rosalind Brannigan et al., The Quality of Highly Regarded Adolescent Substance Abuse
Treatment Programs: Results of an In-depth National Survey, 158 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 904, 904 (2004) (noting that the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition criteria for substance abuse and dependence" were developed for adults and
therefore have "significant limitations when applied to adolescents").
72. See Winters, supra note 68, at 205 (outlining the six stages of adolescent drug involvement
developed by the American Academy of Pediatrics).
73. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics identifies the six stages as:
(1) Abstinence. (2) Experimental use: minimal use, typically associated with
recreational activities; often limited to alcohol use. (3) Early abuse: more established
use, often involving more than one drug; greater frequency than experimental use;
adverse personal consequences begin to emerge. (4) Abuse: regular and frequent use
over an extended period; several adverse consequences emerge. (5) Dependence:
continued regular use despite repeated severe consequences; signs of tolerance;
adjustment of activities to accommodate drug-seeking and drug use. (6) Recovery:
return to abstinence; some youth may relapse and cycle through the stages again.
Id-
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the disease model. 74 As a consequence, some experts caution clinicians to "be
careful not to prematurely diagnose or label adolescents or otherwise pressure them
to accept that they have a chronic disorder that will require life-long abstinence."75
In addition to holding an interest in avoiding the stigma and harmful labeling
associated with a substance misuse diagnosis and invasive treatment, adolescents
also may have interests that can be adversely affected by being coerced into
undergoing treatment. 76 "Coercive influences can take several forms, such as
exclusion from the decision-making process about seeking treatment, use of force
and deceit to impose treatment on the individual, and use of restraint to retain the
person in treatment."77 Although there is some support in the research literature for
the view that coerced treatment can be effective for some adults with substance use
problems,78 there is also reason to conclude that coercion can be counter-
therapeutic in some instances.79 In the case of adolescents, the negative
consequences of coercion, including the decision of parents to approve treatment
against the wishes of their child, may be especially pronounced.so Some experts
warn of "motivational barriers linked to circumstances surrounding the youth's
contact with the service," and suggest that "coercive pressure to seek and continue
treatment is believed to be a barrier to behavior change."8 ' Indeed, even if
treatment for a substance use disorder is an appropriate measure for safeguarding
an adolescent's basic interests (his or her ongoing physical and psychological
74. Compare id. at 204-05 (noting that most adolescents who engage in drug use do not become
drug dependent), with Hungerford, supra note 69, at SIO (noting that the dispositional disease model
considers alcoholism an "incurable" disease that requires suppression through abstinence).
75. Winters, supra note 68, at 209.
76. See Paul, supra note 64, at 309 (stating that a minor who is coerced into medical treatment may
lose a "sense of himself' and miss out on developmental learning opportunities that prepare the minor
for future decision making); Winters, supra note 68, at 210 (explaining that coercing adolescents often
impedes "behavioral change").
77. Winters, supra note 68, at 210.
78. See Norman S. Miller & Joseph A. Flaherty, Effectiveness of Coerced Addiction Treatment
(Alternative Consequences): A Review of the Clinical Research, 18 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT
9, 14 (2000) (noting that coerced treatment can result in improved psychosocial status for the patient and
reduced costs for society).
79. See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and
the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 328-29 (2010) (discussing the low rate of program
completion and the high rate of recidivism among offenders coerced into treatment and asserting that
"success in treatment may depend significantly on the participants' motivation"); see also Karen Duke,
Out of Crime and Into Treatment?: The Criminalization of Contemporary Drug Policy Since Tackling
Drugs Together, 13 DRUGS: EDUC. PREVENTION & POL'Y 409, 412-13 (2006) (arguing that coercive
drug treatment is not always successful).
80. Cf ANNENBERG FOUND. TRUST AT SUNNYLANDS', ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE
UNIV. OF PA., TREATING AND PREVENTING ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS 407 (Dwight L.
Evans et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter ANNENBERG FOUND.] (pointing out that, with regard to cocaine use
by adolescents, coercion by an authority figure may result in limited effectiveness of treatment
approaches).
81. Winters, supra note 68, at 210.
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wellbeing),8 2 the decision of a parent to force that treatment in the face of the
adolescent's resistance could undermine the effectiveness of the treatment,
precisely because the child's developmental and autonomy interests may be in
tension with the parent's use of coercion. 3 Developmental issues, "which include
negotiating levels of autonomy and dependence in relation to parents and families,"
frequently are at the center of effective therapeutic interventions for adolescents
with drug use disorders. 84 Preserving space in the therapeutic relationship for some
measure of autonomous discretion on the part of an adolescent, then, may be an
especially important asset in a successful clinical response to harmful alcohol or
other drug use by that young person.85
There are a number of features associated with the diagnosis and treatment of
adolescent substance misuse that weigh in the other direction, in favor of according
parents greater decision-making authority. 86 As a general matter, individuals with
substance use disorders often experience ambivalence about their circumstances
and the need for behavioral change.87 As the negative consequences of their drug
misuse accumulate, some adults are able to overcome this ambivalence and become
motivated to change harmful drug use behaviors. 8 Often, therapeutic interventions
that assist these individuals to project the costs of their drug use into the future are
crucial to this process of developing the capacity for change.8 9 For developmental
82. See Rebecca A. Powers & Robert Matano, Substance Use and Abuse, in TREATING
ADOLESCENTS 77, 78 (Hans Steiner & Irvin D. Yalom eds., 1996) (arguing that adolescent alcohol and
drug use contributes to mental health problems and delinquency, and as a result all health professionals
have a key role in prevention and treatment).
83. Gains with respect to an adolescent's "sense of himself as an active and responsible participant
in his own health care" may be lost when his or her refusal of treatment is overridden. Paul, supra note
64, at 309. In addition, forced treatment may cause a minor to experience a "loss of trust in professionals
or parents, feeling unheard and therefore abandoning participation, learned helplessness or protest at
being treated unfairly." Id. See ANNENBERG FOUND., supra note 80, at 407 (noting the limited
effectiveness of treatment programs for cocaine use when adolescents are pressured into treatment).
84. Winters, supra note 68, at 209.
85. See Paul, supra note 64, at 309. To the extent that effective treatment for substance use
disorders requires individuals to develop the capacity to assert control over their choices, and to take
responsibility for the consequences of their decisions, safeguarding their autonomy interests may be
especially important; see infra text accompanying notes 248-49.
86. See OSCAR GARY BUKSTEIN, ADOLESCENT SUBSTANCE ABUSE: ASSESSMENT, PREVENTION,
AND TREATMENT 138 (1995) (noting that adolescents are vulnerable to making poor decisions due to a
lack of maturity concerning social, cognitive, and emotional functioning).
87. Howard J. Shaffer, Psychology of Stage Change, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK 100, 102 (Joyce Lowinson et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997).
88. See id. (noting that ambivalence gives way as "[i]ncreasing levels of self observation develop");
see generally James 0. Prochaska et al., In Search of How People Change: Applications to Addictive
Behaviors, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1102 (1992) (discussing the "stages of change" with respect to
addictive behaviors).
89. See Kathleen M. Carroll et al., Motivational Interviewing to Enhance Treatment Initiation in
Substance Abusers: An Effectiveness Study, 10 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 335, 337-38 (2001) (noting that
motivational interviewing seeks to heighten an individual's awareness of the personal consequences of
substance abuse, and concluding that motivational strategies may "substantially increase the likelihood
86 [VOL. 15:75
LEGAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO TREATMENT
reasons, adolescents are less adept than adults at organizing decision-making
processes that take into account the long-range consequences of present actions.90
Adolescents with drug use disorders are especially vulnerable because of this
developmental deficit.9' Because adolescents have more difficulty than adult users
projecting the consequences of their use into the future, their capacity to mobilize
for change, indeed their capacity to understand the need for a new direction, is
likely to be inadequate to overcome the ambivalence or denial that surrounds their
harmful conduct. 92
Recent research into brain development suggests that alcohol and other drug
misuse by young people can be especially damaging because of the particular
neurological vulnerability of adolescents. 93 Early misuse of alcohol and other drugs
is closely correlated with substance dependence later in life. 94 In part, this is likely
due to the "plasticity" of the developing brain, which remains physiologically
immature until a person reaches his or her mid-twenties. 95 This plasticity fosters a
remarkable capacity for learning in adolescents, but it also means that alcohol and
other drug misuse can change a teen's neurophysiology in ways that interfere with
his or her decision making and increase the risk for future dependence. 96 This
research suggests that alcohol and other drug use disorders are diseases of the
young and that interventions early in the process are important to prevent the
development of chronic disorders.
Adolescent substance abuse frequently is associated with additional delays in
the developmental process that further compound the problem and make effective
decision making even more difficult.97 Both cognitive and social-emotional
development often are arrested in young people who misuse alcohol and other
drugs, and learning disorders and other psychopathologies also are frequently co-
of treatment initiation" in substance-abusing individuals); see also Winters, supra note 68, at 206
(explaining that a substance misuse patient may not have the capacity for change until that person
understands the negative consequences of his or her actions).
90. See Winters, supra note 68, at 206.
91. See R. Andrew Chambers et al., Developmental Neurocircuitry of Motivation in Adolescence: A
Critical Period of Addiction Vulnerability, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1042 (2003) (describing
adolescent neurodevelopment as a period of "addiction vulnerability").
92. See Winters, supra note 68, at 206 (noting that ambivalence is a barrier to the treatment process
for all users, but because an adolescent's faculties are not yet fully developed, he or she may have more
problems realizing the "destructive power of drug involvement").
93. NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, ALCOHOL AND
THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT BRAIN 1, available at www.niaaa.nih.gov/AboutNIAAA/NIAAA
SponsoredPrograms/Documents/NIAAA Brain Fact Sheet 508.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id. For example, some researchers have reported that repeated alcohol use during adolescence
can result in cognitive impairments and memory response changes weeks after the use has terminated.
Brain imaging studies have found adolescent alcohol misuse to be associated with a reduction in the size
of the hippocampus. See id.
97. See Winters, supra note 68, at 209.
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occurring challenges. 98 Even in the case of adolescent substance users without co-
occurring mental disabilities or other developmental deficits, the interests of family
harmony may weigh in favor of deferring to the parent's decision with respect to
seeking treatment.99 In Parham, Chief Justice Burger stressed that interposing a
judicial proceeding between parents seeking treatment for their children and those
children could force adversarial interactions that might undermine the very family
relationships that often are crucial to successful outcomes in the treatment of
minors with mental illness.100 Similarly, for adolescents with substance use
disorders, the child's family relationships may provide clinicians with important
material for exploring the origins of the alcohol or other drug use and may provide
effective pressure points for accomplishing beneficial change in the adolescent's
environment and his or her harmful behaviors.' 0 Given the importance of these
family relationships and the key role accorded to the involvement of parents in
some forms of treatment for adolescent substance use disorders,102 it may be that
similar caution is called for in devising decision-making processes likely to
provoke conflict between parents who seek substance use treatment for their
children and those children. 103
C. An Alternative Perspective on the Decision-Making Process
In light of the potential tension between the domains of interest held by
adolescents considering treatment for substance misuse or for other mental illness,
and given the sometimes competing interests held by their parents,104 it is worth
thinking about the decision-making involvement of these adolescents along a
98. Id.; see also Howard B. Moss et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity and Self-Efficacy to Resist Heavy
Drinking in Alcoholic and Nonalcoholic Adolescents, 3 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 204, 205 (1994) (noting
that other psychopathologies, such as "major depressive disorder" and "attention -deficit hyperactivity
disorder," often co-occur with substance use disorders).
99. See Paul, supra note 64, at 303 (noting that the parent's right to make decisions for his or her
child's health care is justified, partly, because of the "importance of family integrity or family
autonomy"). Of course, there may already be substantial family conflict surrounding an adolescent who
is actively resisting his or her parent's insistence on unwanted treatment.
100. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979).
101. See Randolph Much et al., An Overview of the Ejectiveness of Adolescent Substance Abuse
Treatment Models, 33 YOUTH & SOC'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 143, 151 (2001) (noting the "critical influence"
an adolescent's family has in adolescent substance abuse problems); Deborah Deas & Suzanne E.
Thomas, An Overview of Controlled Studies of Adolescent Substance Abuse Treatment, 10 AM. J. ON
ADDICTIONS 178, 179 (2001) (noting that dysfunctional relationships within families play a role in the
maintenance of "problem behaviors"); see also infra text accompanying notes 239-49.
102. See Ashley M. Austin et al., Effective Family-Based Interventions for Adolescents with
Substance Use Problems: A Systematic Review, 15 RES. ON Soc. WORK PRAC. 67, 68 (2005) (describing
family-based substance abuse interventions and the important role of the family system in substance
abuse problems).
103. The question of parental involvement in the treatment process is taken up in greater detail in
Part Ill infra.
104. See Paul, supra note 64, at 302-03 (outlining the rights and interests of both children and
parents when considering treatment and how those interests may differ).
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continuum instead of simply assuming, in a dichotomous fashion, that children
either have the authority to consent (or to withhold consent) to treatment or they do
not. Alderson and Montgomery have suggested such an alternative perspective. 05
In their formulation, the degree of decision-making involvement by an adolescent
in a medical decision-making process can range from simply being informed of the
decision, to being invited to express a view, to being permitted to influence the
decision, to being the main decision-maker. 0 6 Thus, the decision whether or not an
adolescent will undergo treatment for substance misuse or for other mental illness
could conceivably be made by a parent with no involvement by the child, by the
adolescent himself or herself with no parental input, or through a variety of
processes that involve both the adult and the adolescent. 0 7
Elaborating on the relative involvement of adolescents and adults in health-
care decision making, Moli Paul has suggested that children ordinarily should be
encouraged to view their role as that of a "partner" along with the adults involved
in the consideration of alternatives. 08 Paul distinguishes between instances in
which the adolescent is made a participant in the decision-making process and
those in which he or she has the "final say" with respect to treatment. 0 9 In Paul's
view, withholding the final say (thereby placing the treatment decision in the hands
of others) does not mean that the adolescent's views should not be accorded some
weight in the final outcome."10 In circumstances in which the parent authorizes
treatment, the decision may turn on whether the benefits warrant incurring the costs
(to "human dignity" and to the therapeutic relationship) of imposing treatment over
the child's objections, and on the degree of physical or psychological "force"
required to implement the treatment decision.'i To the extent possible, Paul
argues, children should be permitted to take an active part in evaluating options,
even if they independently lack the capacity to grant or withhold consent, or to
have the final say.' 12
105. See PRISCILLA ALDERSON & JONATHAN MONTGOMERY, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: MAKING
DECISIONS WITH CHILDREN 85-86 (1996) (proposing a "code of practice for children's health care
rights" in which a minor may consent to treatment if the minor is competent to do so).
106. Id. at 45, 64-82 (explaining that "[m]any young patients choose to accept their doctors' or
parents' decisions, others wish to share in deciding, a few want to be 'the main decider"'). See also Paul
supra note 64, at 309 (setting out four levels of decision-making involvement for parents and children).
107. See ALDERSON & MONTGOMERY, supra note 105, at 45, 64-82. Of course, the range of
potential decision-making processes should also identify the appropriate role for other participants,
including clinicians, and, potentially, judicial officers and child welfare workers. Id. at 87, 91-92
(discussing the role of different participants, such as doctors and judges, in the decision-making
process).
108. Paul, supra note 64, at 305.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 305, 309 (emphasizing that children should be made aware that their participation in the
decision-making process is important even where the child's preferences may not be decisive).
I 11. Id. at 305.
112. Id. at305,309.
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D. Legal Framework for Decision-Making Authority with Respect to Medical
Treatment
1. State Statutory Standards Governing Consent for the Treatment of Minors
with Substance Use Disorders
Although the legal default position recognized in Parham for adolescent
health-care decisions in general is that adolescents and other children do not have
the final say and thus lack the authority either to consent or to withhold consent for
medical care," 3 the vast majority of states have created statutory exceptions to the
default rule by providing minors with the capacity to consent to treatment for
substance misuse without requiring parental consent as well.114 Some thorny
questions remain, however, in the majority of states that permit minors to consent
to alcohol and other drug misuse treatment. First, in a state that permits minors to
consent to treatment, do parents also have the authority to provide consent for
treatment, either under the general authority that they have to direct the health-care
decisions of their minor children, or pursuant to specific statutory authorization?
And, does this legal authority effectively permit parents to override the decision of
a minor who has withheld his or her consent to treatment? Second, if parents can
authorize substance abuse treatment against the wishes of their children, what legal
procedures, if any, are in place to insure that a parent is acting in the child's
interests? In Parham, of course, the majority held that a neutral judicial decision-
maker is not required prior to the hospital admission of a child for mental illness,
but an independent medical judgment as to the appropriateness of the contemplated
treatment is required.' 15
In the aggregate, thirty-one states have statutes that permit a minor of any age
to consent to alcohol or other drug abuse treatment. 16 In many of these states, the
113. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979).
114. See sources cited infra note 116. For a general discussion of the competence of minors to
consent to mental health treatment, see also Redding, supra note 16 at 712. A few states distinguish
between inpatient and outpatient substance misuse treatment and some prohibit minors from consenting
to methadone treatment. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-338 (2010) (addressing inpatient treatment);
VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2629(E)(3)(2009) (addressing outpatient treatment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-
760 (2002) (requiring that parents consent to adolescents' methadone treatment).
115. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-08.
116. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (LexisNexis 2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2024 (2009); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-102 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-682 (West 2006); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 397.601(4)(a) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-8(b) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
577-26(e) (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-307(1) (2011); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
301/30-5(d) (West 2008); IND. CODE. ANN. § 12-23-12-1 (LexisNexis 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §
125.33(l) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 222.441 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1096(A) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1502 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
102(c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.6121(1) (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.343(1) (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.061(l)(4)(c) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-1-402(2)(c) (2011); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 129.050(l)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:17A-4 (West Supp. 2011); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11 (b)-(c)(1) (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN.
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relevant statute simply provides that minors have the legal capacity to apply for
treatment services." 7 For example, in Idaho, "[a]n alcoholic or a drug addict may
apply for voluntary treatment directly to any approved public treatment facility. If
the proposed patient is a minor or an incompetent person, he, a parent, legal
guardian, or other legal representative shall make the application."' 18 In other
states, the law explicitly removes the disability of minority that otherwise would
preclude an adolescent from obtaining substance misuse treatment on his or her
own.1 9 For instance, in Florida:
[t]he disability of minority for persons under 18 years of age is
removed solely for the purpose of obtaining voluntary substance
abuse impairment services from a licensed service provider, and
consent to such services by a minor has the same force and effect as
if executed by an individual who has reached the age of majority.
Such consent is not subject to later disaffirmance based on
minority. 120
An additional thirteen states permit minors above a specified age to consent to
substance abuse treatment.121 The statutory ages range from twelve 22 to sixteen-
years-old.123 Six states do not have statutes permitting minors to consent on their
own to substance abuse treatment.124 One state, New York, has adopted a statutory
STAT. § 90-21.5(a) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012(a) (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 2602(A)(3) (West 2004); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1690.112 (West 1990 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 14-5-4 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-50 (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
32.003(a)(5) (West 2008); VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2969(E)(3) (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60-6-23
(LexisNexis 2010).
117. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2024(A) (Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-
82-105 (West 2010).
118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-307(l) (2011).
119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.601(4)(a) (West 2011).
120. Id.
121. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(b) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2210(b) (2003); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29b49(B) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12(E) (West 2003); MIss. CODE.
ANN. § 41-41-14(I) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:12-a (LexisNexis 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-10-17 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.675 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-52-20 (2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-6-201(1) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.96A.095 (West 2011); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.47 (West 2008). In a few states the age requirement
depends on whether the proposed treatment is inpatient or outpatient. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2210(b) (2003) (non-residential substance abuse treatment may be provided to minors over fourteen
years of age without parental consent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.96A.095 (West 2011) (authorizing
minors over age thirteen to consent to outpatient treatment).
122. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4226(a) (2002).
123. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-52-20 (2002).
124. Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. See ALASKA
STAT. § 47.37.170 (2010) (general statute not particularized for minors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-64-810
(2001) (general statute not providing for minors to consent to treatment); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5041
(2009) (repealed 2004) (as of 2004, the state no longer permits minors to consent to treatment for
substance abuse); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-6A-21(B) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating that minors over the
age of fourteen can consent to treatment only in conjunction with parental consent); UTAH CODE ANN. §
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scheme under which a minor's consent is recognized only in circumstances in
which a physician or other authorized treatment provider makes specific findings
that drug or alcohol treatment is in the child's medical interest, and that either the
involvement of the parent or guardian in the treatment process would be
detrimental to the minor, or the parent or guardian refuses to give consent or is
unavailable.125 In Massachusetts a child over the age of twelve may consent to
treatment for drug dependency, but only if two physicians have found that that the
child is drug dependent.126
The laws in a handful of states permit minors to consent to outpatient
substance abuse treatment, but not inpatient services.127 In addition, four states
withhold from minors the authority to consent to methadone treatment 28 or other
"replacement narcotic abuse treatment." 29 This last restriction is problematic,
given that pharmacotherapy has come to play "an increasingly important role in the
treatment of adult alcoholism and drug addiction," and "data and clinical
experience provide sufficient justification for substance use disorder treatment to
suspend blanket 'no-medication' rules for deserving adolescent clients." 30
On the other side of the coin, there is more variation from state to state (and
greater uncertainty in many states)' 3' with respect to the authority of parents to
approve substance use treatment over the objection of a resisting adolescent.132 A
small minority of jurisdictions accompany the statutory grant of authority to minors
with a corresponding provision reserving a parallel right for parents to consent to
62A-15-301(l)-(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (giving only parents the ability to consent to minors treatment);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101(b) (2011) (allowing minors to consent only if married, in the armed
forces, or when a parent cannot be reasonably located).
125. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11 (c)(1) (McKinney 2006).
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (West 2003).
127. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.96A.095 (West 2011).
128. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12(E) (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.675
(2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §44-53-760 (2002).
129. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(e) (West 2004).
130. Winters, supra note 68, at 210; see Richard C. Boldt, Introdction: Obstacles to the
Development and Use of Pharmacotherapies for Addiction, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y I, 3 (2010)
(explaining the role pharmacotherapies have played and could play in substance abuse treatments).
13 1. See David M. Vukadinovich, Minors' Rights to Consent to Treatment: Navigating the
Complexity of State Laws, 37 J. HEALTH L. 667, 668 (2004) (noting that state laws attempting to
"balance the rights and obligations of parents against the privacy rights of minors" have resulted in a
confusing and sometimes conflicting set of provisions); see also Lallemont et al., supra note 16, at 332-
34 (discussing lack of clarity and resulting confusion in how state laws manage conflict between parents
and adolescents over whether to approve inpatient substance misuse treatment); cf CAL. FAM. CODE §
6929(b)-(f) (West 2011) (granting children over the age of twelve the right to consent to substance use
treatment, but requiring the involvement of the child's guardian if a physician deems it appropriate, and
permitting a child's guardian to seek treatment for the child over the child's objections).
132. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1.10-12 (2002) (providing that a guardian can consent to the
involuntary treatment of a person if he or she is an alcoholic), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 222.441(2)
(West 2006) (providing that a minor who is being treated pursuant to the consent of his or her parents
can petition the court to evaluate the necessity of treatment).
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treatment even if their child does not consent.'33 Another group of states recognizes
parental authority to approve substance use treatment for children, but conditions
the exercise of that authority on satisfying procedural requirements that go beyond
the constitutional minima set out in Parham.134 In Wisconsin, for example, a parent
may authorize the testing by a treatment facility of a minor for alcohol or other
drug abuse, even without the minor's consent, and, if the facility deems it
necessary, may agree to an appropriate plan of treatment, including outpatient
services, day treatment, or inpatient care.i 35 However, if an adolescent who is
fourteen-years-old or older is admitted to inpatient treatment for substance misuse
(or for other mental disabilities) without consenting to that treatment, Wisconsin
law requires the treatment director of the facility to which the minor is admitted, or
his or her designee, to file within three days of admission a verified petition for
review of the admission in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county in which
the facility is located.136 Within five days after the filing of the petition, the court is
directed to:
determine, based on the allegations of the petition and accompanying
documents, whether there is a prima facie showing that the minor is
in need of . .. services for . .. alcoholism, or drug abuse, whether the
treatment facility offers inpatient therapy or treatment that is
appropriate to the minor's needs; [and] whether inpatient care in the
treatment facility is the least restrictive therapy or treatment
consistent with the needs of the minor . . . .137
A majority of states neither have clarifying statutes nor additional procedural
protections, presumably relying on the background legal presumption of parental
authority over medical decision making for minors.'38 In some of these
jurisdictions, the rights of parents to authorize treatment against their child's wishes
133. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(f) (West 2004); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4.1 (West 2002);
see also Vukadinovich, supra note 131, at 684 (comparing New Jersey and California law regarding
authority to consent to drug and alcohol abuse treatment and counseling).
134. See, e.g., 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1690.112a (West Supp. 2011) (requiring that parents
petition the court to authorize treatment for their child).
135. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.48 (West 2008).
136. Id. § 51.13(4). The petition must contain a statement of "facts substantiating the petitioner's
belief in the minor's need for . .. services for ... alcoholism or drug abuse; ... [t]he facts substantiating
the appropriateness of inpatient treatment in the inpatient treatment facility; . . . [t]he basis for the
petitioner's opinion that inpatient care in the facility is the least restrictive treatment consistent with the
needs of the minor; . . . [and n]otation of any statement made or conduct demonstrated by the minor in
the presence of the director or staff of the facility indicating that inpatient treatment is against the wishes
of the minor." Id.
137. Id. The statute provides that the "rules of evidence in civil actions shall apply to any hearing
under this section. A record shall be maintained of the entire proceedings. The record shall include
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings shall be based on a clear and convincing standard of
proof." Id.
138. Cf Vukadinovich, supra note 131, at 668 (noting that while states attempt to balance parental
interests against minors' privacy rights, statutes fail to address varying concerns in a uniform manner).
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have been clarified by judicial decision or attorney general opinion. 3 9 In Louisiana,
for instance, the Attorney General issued an opinion stating that even though a
minor has the statutory right to consent to treatment, he or she does not have the
right to refuse care when that treatment is authorized by the child's parent or legal
guardian and is proposed by a licensed physician. 140
In Maryland, while "[a] minor has the same capacity as an adult to consent to
treatment for or advice about drug abuse . .. [or] alcoholism,"'41 the governing
statute makes clear that this capacity "does not include the capacity to refuse
treatment for drug abuse or alcoholism in an inpatient alcohol or drug abuse
treatment program . .. for which a parent or guardian has given consent." 42
Because Maryland law only deals explicitly with the rights of parents regarding
inpatient treatment, it is an open question whether the capacity of the minor to
consent permits him or her to refuse outpatient substance misuse treatment for
which a parent has given consent.143 The argument against the right of the minor to
resist such treatment is that it is inherent in the background norm that parents have
the authority to make health-care decisions for their minor children.144 The
argument for the minor's right to refuse is that the statutory limitation to inpatient
care implies no equivalent reservation of the parent's authority to override the
adolescent's decision with respect to outpatient services.
With respect to procedural protections, Maryland's law governing the
admission of minors to inpatient treatment facilities for the treatment of substance
misuse parallels the Parham approach in relying on the independent medical
judgment of the care provider, rather than a judicial determination that the
treatment is necessary and appropriate.145 This provision states that a parent may
apply for his or her child's admission to a certified inpatient alcohol and drug abuse
program, but that the program may not admit the child until it has determined that:
139. See, e.g., In re F.C. 111, 2 A.3d 1201, 1205 (Pa. 2010) (holding that a Pennsylvania Law
allowing parents to authorize treatment against their child's wishes does not violate the due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment).
140. La. Op. Att'y Gen., No. 88-232 (1988).
141. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102(c) (LexisNexis 2009).
142. Id. § 20-102(c-1).
143. See id. ("The capacity of a minor to consent to treatment for drug abuse or alcoholism under
subsection (c)(1) or (2) of this section does not include the capacity to refuse treatment for drug abuse or
alcoholism in an inpatient alcohol or drug abuse treatment program certified under Title 8 of this article
for which a parent or guardian has given consent.").
144. See Paul, supra note 64, at 303 (providing an overview of parents' rights with regard to the
health care of their children).
145. Compare MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-502.1(b)(l)-(4) (LexisNexis 2009) (permitting
minors to be admitted based on "program or facility" determinations), with Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S.
584, 604 (1979) (noting that parents do not always have absolute authority to decide whether to commit
a child to a treatment facility, but they do "retain plenary authority to seek such care for their children,
subject to a physician's independent examination and medical judgment").
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(1) The [child] has an alcohol or other drug dependency that
necessitates the level of care provided by the program or facility; (2)
The [child] would benefit from treatment; (3) The parent or guardian
making application for admission of the [child] understands the
nature of the request for admission and the nature of the treatment
provided by the program or facility; and (4) Assent to the admission
has been given by the Director or the Director's designee of the
program or facility.146
Michigan law provides yet another variation on how to manage the conflict
between a parent who seeks substance use treatment for his or her child and the
adolescent who resists that care.147 If the minor is less than fourteen-years-old, the
parent or guardian's consent is sufficient to authorize treatment.148 If the child is
fourteen or older, the treatment program must conduct a diagnostic evaluation
within forty-eight hours to determine whether the minor is physiologically
dependent.149 If the evaluation indicates the minor is in need of detoxification, then
parental consent is sufficient to authorize up to five days of treatment.o50 On the
other hand, if the evaluation indicates the minor is in need of substance misuse
treatment and rehabilitation services beyond detoxification, then the treatment and
services cannot begin until the minor consents, or there is a court hearing to
determine if such services are necessary.' 5' This statutory scheme structures a
decision-making process that affords Michigan parents significant authority,
particularly in the case of minors whose substance misuse requires intensive
detoxification services. At the same time, it is notable that the procedure also
insures that the views of older adolescents are taken into consideration to some
degree, at least in the context of a mandated court hearing.
2. Laws Governing Consent for the Treatment of Minors with Mental Illness
Although a few states deal with the capacity of minors to consent to substance
misuse treatment in statutes that also deal with their authority to consent to
146. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-502.1(b)(l)-(4) (LexisNexis 2009). The Maryland statute
also sets out conditions for retention of the minor in inpatient substance abuse treatment. See id. § 8-
502.1(c). "In order for an individual to be retained for treatment under this section[,] [t]he parent or
guardian who applied for admission of the individual shall have the right to be actively involved in
treatment." Id. § 8-502.1(c)(1). It is important to note the potential confidentiality problem here, if the
minor withholds consent to disclose information to the parent. See infra Part III (discussing
confidentiality and disclosure of treatment information to an adolescent's parent).
147. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.6123(1)-(7) (West 2001) (permitting a program to provide
substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation services without the child's consent if the child is under the
age of fourteen, and providing specific requirements for treatment if the child is over the age of fourteen
and does not consent).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 333.6123(3).
150. Id. § 333.6123(4).
151. Id. § 333.6123(5)-(6).
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treatment for mental illness,'52 in most states it is a separate question whether
minors are permitted to consent to mental health treatment other than treatment for
substance abuse without the involvement of their parent or guardian. 5 3 Since the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Parham, some states have enacted
legislation to meet the procedural standards set forth in that case. 154 Other states
have adopted statutes that go beyond the minimal due process protections afforded
in Parham. 155 Overall, there is considerable variation among the states as to the
procedural requirements, if any, over and above the constitutional minima
established by the Parham court, for evaluating a parent's request for inpatient
treatment of a minor child for mental disabilities other than drug and alcohol
abuse.156
In Maryland, while "[a] minor who is [sixteen] years old or older has the
same capacity as an adult to consent to consultation, diagnosis, and treatment of a
mental or emotional disorder by a physician, psychologist, or a clinic[,]" 5 7 this
capacity to consent to mental health treatment "does not include the capacity to
refuse consultation, diagnosis, or treatment for a mental or emotional disorder for
152. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-221 (2009) ("Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a
minor may be admitted to a facility if the minor is mentally ill or a substance abuser and in need of
treatment."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-503(A) (West Supp. 2011) ("A parent of a minor or a
minor sixteen (16) years of age or older may consent to the voluntary admission of the minor for
inpatient mental health or substance abuse treatment."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(1) (2007)
(referring to treatment for "mental illness"); id. § 33-1-101(19) (Supp. 2011) (defining "mental illness"
as a "psychiatric disorder, alcohol dependence, or drug dependence . . .").
153. Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21(b) (McKinney 2006) (focusing on consent for
mental health treatment of minors and recognizing the importance of involving the parent or guardian in
the mental health treatment of a minor), with id. § 22.11(b) (addressing separately the treatment of
minors for chemical dependency, but also recognizing the importance of parental/guardian
involvement). Compare MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-502.1(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating
the conditions for admission and retention of minors to alcohol and drug abuse programs or facilities),
with id. § 10-610(c) (detailing limitations for admission of minors to treatment facilities for mental
health treatment).
154. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1498e(3)(a)-(b) (West 1999) (requiring the executive
director of a treatment facility to decide if a minor is in need of treatment or hospitalization, whether he
or she will benefit from such treatment and whether other treatment is available).
155. Parham v. J. R. 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979) (setting out the constitutional minima to protect a
minor's interest by requiring an application from a parent or guardian and a subsequent review by a
neutral fact finder, such as a physician). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.37.190(a) (2010) (requiring a
parent or guardian seeking involuntary commitment of a minor to petition court for a 30-day involuntary
commitment order by showing that the minor has threatened, attempted to, or harmed another person, or
"is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs").
156. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1498e(3)(a)-(b) (West 1999) (requiring the
executive director to decide if a minor requires treatment or hospitalization, whether he or she will
benefit from such treatment, and whether another treatment option is available), with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5122.02(B)-(C) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring the chief clinical officer of the hospital to find that
hospitlization of the minor is appropriate, and a court to determine that the admission is in the best
interest of the minor).
157. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-104(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
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which a parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor has given consent."' 5 8 The
provisions in Maryland for dealing with the voluntary admission of a minor for
inpatient treatment for mental illness are similar but not identical to those for
substance abuse treatment.'59 A parent may apply for admission of a minor by
submitting a formal written application. 60 The application requires the
endorsement of a physician stating that he or she has examined the patient and has
determined that the criteria for admission have been met.' 6 1 In New York, the law
governing outpatient mental health treatment largely tracks the provision for
minors seeking treatment for alcohol or other drug misuse.162 Thus, a mental health
clinician is permitted to provide outpatient mental health services to a consenting
adolescent without obtaining parental consent if the clinician:
determines that: (1) the minor is knowingly and voluntarily seeking
such services; and (2) provision of such services is clinically
indicated and necessary to the minor's well-being; and (3)(i) a parent
or guardian is not reasonably available; or (ii) requiring parental or
guardian consent or involvement would have a detrimental effect on
the course of outpatient treatment; or (iii) a parent or guardian has
refused to give such consent and a physician determines that
treatment is necessary and in the best interests of the minor.'6 3
A Michigan statute that protects the procedural rights of minors whose
parents seek their "voluntary" hospitalization is typical of state provisions that
codify the Parham requirements.'6" Pursuant to the statute, before a minor can be
158. Id. § 20-104(a)(2).
159. Compare id. § 10-610(c) (requiring that an applicant submit a formal, written application
establishing the presence of a mental disorder that can be aided through treatment, that the applicant
comprehends his or her request for treatment, and that a physician at the admission facility has agreed or
that two doctors or a doctor and psychologist have agreed in the case of an adolescent in a State facility),
with id. § 8-502.1(b) (requiring a determination that the patient has a need for substance abuse treatment,
the patient would benefit from treatment, the parent or guardian understands the ramifications in asking
for treatment, and the Director or designee of the program has assented to admission).
160. Id § 10-610(b).
161. Id § 10-610. These criteria are: (1) the proposed patient must have a mental disorder; (2) the
mental disorder must be "susceptible to care or treatment;" and (3) the parent or guardian must
understand the request for admission. Id. § 10-610 (c)(I)-(3). If all of these criteria are met, the minor
can be admitted if a physician (if a private facility) or two physicians or a physician and a psychologist
(if a state facility) determine it is appropriate. Id. § 10-610(c)(4). If the application is to a state facility,
admission is limited to a maximum of 20 days. Id. § 10-610(d).
162. Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 2006) (focusing on consent for mental
health treatment of minors and recognizing the importance of involving the parent or guardian in the
mental health treatment of a minor), with id. § 22.11 (addressing the treatment of minors for chemical
dependency, but also recognizing the importance of parental and guardian involvement).
163. Id. § 33.21(c). Moreover, "[a] mental health practitioner may provide a minor voluntarily
seeking outpatient services an initial interview without parental or guardian consent or involvement to
determine whether the criteria of subdivision (c) of this section are present." Id. § 33.21(d).
164. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1498e(3)(a)-(b) (West 1999) (requiring the
executive director to decide whether a minor requires treatment or hospitalization, whether he or she will
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hospitalized for mental health treatment, the County Director must determine that
inpatient treatment is required.165 If the minor is determined to need hospitalization,
the suitability of the placement must be evaluated ninety days after the initial
admission and every sixty days thereafter.'66 Minors have thirty days to file an
objection in court challenging their hospitalization.167
In addition to legislative codification, minors' rights to due process and
judicial oversight when institutionalized have occasionally received consideration
in state courts and lower federal courts since Parham.'68 For example, in T.B. v.
CPC Fairfax Hospital, 169 the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case of a
fifteen-year-old girl who was admitted to a hospital as an inpatient after a ten-
minute evaluation by a psychiatrist, during which she did not cooperate. 70 After
the hospital refused repeated attempts by T.B.'s attorney's to contact T.B., the
minor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 7' Upon review, the Washington
Supreme Court found that minors who refuse to consent to inpatient mental health
treatment but are admitted by their parents nonetheless, have a statutory right to a
prompt judicial review of the admission decision.172 In addition to a right to be
heard, some courts have also found that minors have a right to legal
benefit from such treatment and whether alternative treatment is available), and UTAH CODE ANN. §
62A-15-301(l)-(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (permitting a parent to consent to the involuntary treatment of a
minor only after a neutral fact-finder conducts a private interview evaluating the need for child's
treatment), with Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (1979) ("The child's rights and the nature of the
commitment decision are such that parents do not always have absolute discretion to institutionalize a
child; they retain plenary authority to seek such care for their children, subject to an independent
medical judgment.").
165. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1498e(3)(a)-(b) (West 1999). Under the statute, the following
must be established: (1) the minor is in need of treatment; (2) hospitalization will help the minor; and (3)
there is no "appropriate, available alternative to hospitalization." Id. In order to determine the
appropriateness of hospitalization, the county director must consult with several agencies, including the
school board, hospitals, and other public and private agencies. Id. § 330.1498e(3)(c).
166. Id. § 330.14981(1).
167. Id. § 330.1498m.
168. See In re Antoine C., 230 Cal. Rptr. 738, 739 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that due process requires
that an attorney be appointed for a minor in a recommitment hearing); In re F.C. III., 2 A.3d 1201, 1220
(Pa. 2010) (concluding that a statute permitting court-ordered treatment of a drug dependent minor
comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington ex rel. T.B. v.
CPC Fairfax Hosp., 918 P.2d 497, 504 (Wash. 1996) ("We cannot ignore these statutory violations in
light of our previous holding that '[t]here is no question that due process guaranties must accompany
involuntary commitment for mental disorders. . .
169. 918 P.2d 497 (Wash. 1996).
170. Id at 498-99.
171. Id at 500.
172. Id. at 508. See also M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000) ("Whether or not an
evidentiary hearing is constitutionally mandated, our legal system at the very least should afford the
child, through his or her attorney and/or guardian ad litem, a meaningful opportunity to be heard.").
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representation. 73 Overall, however, courts have shown an overriding concern for
safeguarding the decision-making authority of parents, and have sought to avoid
infringing on family autonomy.174 Consequently, courts rarely have overturned the
decision of parents, acting with clinicians, to authorize inpatient treatment for
children with mental illness. 75
III. THE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT INFORMATION TO AN
ADOLESCENT'S PARENTS OR OTHERS
In some states, the legislature has addressed the question whether a minor's
parents either may or must be notified in instances in which the minor is receiving
substance misuse treatment on his or her own consent. In one group of states,
treatment providers have a statutory duty to notify the minor's parents, even if the
child refuses to give permission for this disclosure. 7 6 Other states either encourage
or permit treatment providers to notify parents in these circumstances, even without
the minor's agreement to disclose.' 77 By contrast, only a small minority of states
have statutes that expressly prohibit treatment providers from disclosing
information or otherwise notifying the minor's parent or guardian absent the
minor's consent for disclosure. 7 8
173. See In re Antoine C., 230 Cal. Rptr. at 739. See generally Jinanne S.J. Elder, The Role of
Counselfor Children: A Proposal for Addressing a Troubling Question, 35 BOsTON BAR J. 6 (1991)
(discussing minors' right to counsel and the role and ethical responsibilities of counsel for minors).
174. Schlam & Wood, supra note 13, at 149-50; see also Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108,
1115 (Del. 1991) (noting that upholding the integrity of the family unit is a recognized principle of law,
which involves acknowledging parental decision-making authority).
175. See, e.g., In re Long, 214 S.E.2d 626, 629 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that although minors
are entitled to constitutional protection at some stage, a parent's authority in initially seeking treatment
outweighs the necessity for a court hearing prior to initial admission).
176. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(b)-(c) & (g) (West 2004), which states:
A minor who is 12 years of age or older may consent to medical care and counseling
relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a drug- or alcohol-related problem . . . . The
treatment plan of a minor authorized by this section shall include the involvement of the
minor's parent or guardian, if appropriate, as determined by the professional person or
treatment facility treating the minor. The professional person providing medical care or
counseling to a minor shall state in the minor's treatment record whether and when the
professional person attempted to contact the minor's parent or guardian, and whether the
attempt to contact the parent or guardian was successful or unsuccessful, or the reason
why, in the opinion of the professional person, it would not be appropriate to contact the
minor's parent or guardian.
177. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(2) (West 2001), which provides:
For medical reasons a treating physician, and on the advice and direction of the treating
physician, a physician, a member of the medical staff of a hospital or clinic, or other
health professional, may, but is not obligated to, inform the spouse, parent, guardian, or
person in loco parentis as to the treatment given or needed. The information may be
given to or withheld from these persons without consent of the minor and
notwithstanding the express refusal of the minor to the providing of the information.
178. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.33 (West 2007) ("The fact that the minor sought treatment or
rehabilitation or is receiving treatment or rehabilitation services shall not be reported or disclosed to the
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These various parental notification provisions under state law implicate, and
in some cases conflict with, the federal law and regulations governing the
confidentiality of alcohol and other drug misuse treatment information.179 Indeed,
most of the issues with respect to the relative legal authority of actors within the
triad made up of a minor patient, his or her parents, and the treatment provider,
regarding treatment decisions, are further complicated by the complex interaction
of federal and state rules governing the confidentiality of this information. 80 For
present purposes, two questions under the confidentiality law and regulations are of
central importance. First, if an adolescent or other minor is in substance abuse
treatment pursuant to his or her own consent, may the treatment provider
communicate patient-identifying information to the child's parent over the minor
patient's objections, if doing so would support the minor's treatment, perhaps under
a "family systems" approach to treatment?'"' Second, if the treatment of an
adolescent or other minor for substance misuse is based on parental consent that
was given over the objections of the child, what health privacy protections attach to
information about that treatment, and what information can be shared with the
parents or with others, even in the absence of the minor's agreement to a
disclosure?
parents or legal guardian of such minor without the minor's consent, and the minor may give legal
consent to receive such treatment and rehabilitation.").
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006). The drug abuse treatment information confidentiality law was
initially passed as § 408 of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86
Stat. 79 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1982)). That section was transferred and amended by
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. 98-24, 97 Stat. 182 to § 527 of the Public
Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1988 & Supp. 1993). The codification of an
identical provision relating to the confidentiality of alcohol abuse treatment information can be found at
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (1988 & Supp. 1993). Both statutes were amended in 1986 to allow treatment
providers to comply with state law child abuse and neglect reporting requirements. Children's Justice
and Assistance Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-401, § 106, 100 Stat. 907 (1986) (amending sections 523(e)
and 527(e) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(e), 290ee-3(e)). In 1992, Congress
consolidated the two confidentiality statutes into a single provision. The regulations implementing these
statutes are entitled Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67
(2010).
180. Id; cf Douglas C. Smith et al., Parental Consent in Adolescent Substance Abuse Treatment
Outcome Studies, 37 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 298, 299 (2009) (describing the complex
relationship between federal confidentiality laws and state statutes).
181. Those states that have adopted statutes either requiring or permitting this sort of disclosure have
done so on the theory that parental involvement in treatment is in the child's interest. See, e.g., N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11(b) (McKinney 2006) (recognizing that parents play a critical role in
treating a minor for chemical dependency). Presumably, this policy preference for parental involvement
is based on a family systems view of treatment for adolescent drug use. See Timothy J. Ozechowski &
Howard A. Liddle, Family-Based Therapy for Adolescent Drug Abuse: Knowns and Unknowns, 3
CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REv. 269, 270 (2000) (discussing the importance of family-based
treatment in adolescent substance abuse intervention); see also infra text accompanying notes 239-49.
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A. The Federal Alcohol and other Drug Misuse Confidentiality Law and
Regulations
Although the rules governing the disclosure of mental health treatment
information to a minor's parents are relatively permissive in many states,182 the
provisions in federal law governing the disclosure of substance misuse treatment
information are far more restrictive.'83 Generally, under the federal confidentiality
law and implementing regulations,184 a substance misuse treatment program'85 is
prohibited from disclosing information about an individual, even to family
members and close friends, if the disclosure would identify that person as someone
who misuses alcohol or other drugs.' 86 A "disclosure" under this law is any oral or
written "communication of patient-identifying information," even if the
communication simply confirms information the recipient already knows.187 The
prohibition on disclosure applies to all persons who are "patients" within the
meaning of the statute and regulations. 88 A "patient" is any person "who has
applied for" or received "diagnosis or treatment" for alcohol or other drug
misuse.'89 "Diagnosis" is defined as "any reference to an individual's alcohol or
drug abuse or to a condition which is identified as having been caused by that abuse
which is made for the purpose of treatment or referral for treatment." 90
"Treatment" is "the management and care of a patient suffering from alcohol or
drug abuse, a condition which is identified as having been caused by that abuse, or
both, in order to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects upon the patient."'91
Putting these provisions together, a person becomes a "patient" protected by the
182. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 2006) (recognizing the importance of
the parental role and when possible requiring a parent's or guardian's consent); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102(f) (LexisNexis 2009) (allowing an attending physician or psychologist to
decide whether to notify the parent or guardian of a minor who voluntarily seeks treatment, even without
the minor's consent).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(2) (2006).
184. Id.; 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67 (2010).
185. The regulations define a "program" as "[a]n individual or entity ... who holds itself [sic] out as
providing, and provides, alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment .... 42
C.F.R. § 2.11 (2010). The regulations consider a program to be "federally assisted" if it accepts any type
of funds from the federal government. This may include Medicaid or Medicare reimbursements, or a tax
exemption by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. § 2.12(b). The 1987 amendments to the regulations state
that they are limited to specialized personnel within a general hospital or community mental health
center. Id. § 2.11. For a more detailed analysis of the effect of these amendments, and their interpretation
by several courts, see Richard C. Boldt, Confidentiality of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment
Information for Emergency Department and Trauma Center Patients, 20 HEALTH MATRIx 387, 403-08
(2010) [hereinafter Confidentiality ofAlcohol].
186. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.12-2.13(a) (2010).
187. Id. §2.11.
188. Id.
189. Id
190. Id.
191. Id.
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federal confidentiality law the moment he or she has received an assessment,
counseling services, or any other related diagnostic, referral, or treatment service by
a substance misuse treatment provider, even if the individual is not ultimately
admitted for ongoing treatment.192
Notwithstanding the unusually restrictive nature of the federal confidentiality
law and regulations, 93 the disclosure of patient information is permitted if a patient
executes a proper written consent form.194 The rules governing disclosure pursuant
to patient consent apply to adolescents and other minors in treatment.195 The
possibility of sharing confidential information pursuant to the minor's written
consent becomes potentially important in arranging the parental approval for
substance misuse treatment required under some states' laws. The federal
confidentiality law and regulations leave the issue of whether a minor can obtain
192. Id. In order for a communication of information to be a "disclosure" that is subject to the federal
law restriction, it must identify an individual as a substance misuse "patient." Id. § 2.12(e)(4).
Consequently, a communication that does not associate an individual with alcohol or other drug misuse
treatment (which may be possible when the program conveys information through an "umbrella" agency
such as a general hospital or county public health department) or that appears in the form of aggregate
data is not prohibited. See id. § 2.12(e)(3) (noting that the restrictions on disclosure only apply to "any
information which would identify a patient as an alcohol or drug abuser"). In addition, a communication
of information that is patient-identifying is not considered a prohibited disclosure if it takes place
between personnel "within a program," so long as the recipient of the protected information has a need
for the information in connection with his or her duties in the provision of treatment services to the
patient. Id § 2.12(c)(3). The regulations also permit the communication of patient-identifying
information to outside entities that provide services in support of the treatment provider, if the outside
entity enters into a "qualified service organization" agreement in which it agrees to treat any patient-
identifying information it receives with full confidentiality. Id. § 2.12(c)(4). Essentially, this sort of an
agreement brings the outside service provider into the program, thus converting the disclosure into an
internal communication. Id. Other exceptions exist for patient-identifying disclosures in cases of
"medical emergency," id. § 2.51 (This exception is limited to extremely serious circumstances, and only
"medical personnel" may receive patient-identifying information), when a crime has been threatened or
committed on program premises or against program staff, id. § 2.12(c)(5), when program personnel
suspect that a patient is engaged in child abuse or neglect, id. § 2.12(c)(6), or when a court has issued a
proper authorizing court order, id §§ 2.61-.67. (Before such an order may be issued, the court must
follow elaborate procedures, must find "good cause" for the information to be disclosed, and must limit
the disclosure accordingly. These procedural and substantive requirements make this order much more
difficult to obtain than other more familiar forms of compulsory process, such as warrants and
subpoenas.)
193. See generally id. §§ 2.12-.13 (specifying limited circumstances for disclosure of patient
information).
194. Id. § 2.31. The consent provisions of the federal regulations require that the patient's waiver of
confidentiality be in writing. Id. The form must identify the patient, the treatment provider, and the
recipient of the information to be disclosed. Id. The written form also must contain a statement of the
purpose for the proposed disclosure, a description of the precise information to be communicated, an
identification of the date, event or condition upon which the consent will expire, and "[a] statement that
the consent is subject to revocation at any time" unless the program "has already acted in reliance on it."
Id.
195. See id. § 2.14 (stating that a minor's consent is necessary for disclosure to a parent or guardian);
id. § 2.31(a)(6).
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substance abuse treatment without parental consent up to state law.1 96 With respect
to authorizing the disclosure of patient-identifying information, however, the
federal regulations provide that parental consent for disclosure to a third party is
required only if parental consent is also required for treatment under state law.1 97 If
parental consent is not required to treat then it also is not required in order for a
treatment program to disclose confidential information.' 98 On the other hand, the
minor's written consent is always required for a disclosure of patient-identifying
information, even if the disclosure is to a child's parents and the state law requires
parental consent to authorize treatment.' 99 This means that the minor's written
permission is required under the federal confidentiality regime before a treatment
provider can contact the child's parents in order to obtain parental consent to treat
in a state that does not permit minors to consent to substance abuse treatment on
their own. 200
One of the most difficult problems in this area arises when a minor has
applied for treatment without his or her parents' knowledge in a state where
treatment requires the parents' approval. In this situation, the program can contact
the parents to obtain their permission only if the minor has signed a consent form,
because the request for parent approval is itself a disclosure of patient-identifying
information (that the child has sought substance misuse treatment services). 201 If
the child refuses to consent to this disclosure in a state that requires parental
approval, the treatment provider must refuse to proceed with treatment. The federal
regulations do contain a very limited exception to the requirement that the minor
must authorize disclosure to his or her parent, for situations where the program
director determines that the minor "lacks the capacity to make a rational choice"
about whether or not to consent to disclosure. 202 In order to find a lack of capacity,
however, the director must determine that, because of "extreme youth or medical
condition," the minor is incapable of a rational decision, and the situation poses a
"substantial threat to the life or physical well-being of the [minor] or another
individual." 203
As noted earlier, New York's law contains a strong presumption in favor of
parental involvement in the treatment of minors for substance misuse, 204 but
permits clinicians to provide treatment without parental consent if, in their
196. Id. § 2.14.
197. 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(c).
198. Id. § 2.14(b).
199. Id. § 2.14(c)(2).
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Id. § 2.14(c)(2)(ii).
203. Id. § 2.14(d).
204. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11(b) (McKinney 2006) (stating that when treating a minor
for substance abuse, it is important to involve the parents or guardians as much as possible).
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judgment, "parental or guardian involvement and consent would have a detrimental
effect on the course of treatment of a minor who is voluntarily seeking treatment
for chemical dependence," or the "parent or guardian refuses to consent to such
treatment and the physician believes that such treatment is necessary for the best
interests of the child," or the treatment provider "cannot locate the parents or
guardians of a minor seeking treatment." 205 Significantly, the statutory requirement
applicable to all other minors in New York receiving substance misuse treatment,
that "[s]teps shall be taken to involve the parents or guardians in the course of
treatment," 206 does not apply to minors whose parents have not provided consent
for treatment. In the place of mandated parental involvement, New York law directs
the provider of inpatient or residential treatment services to "use its best efforts to
obtain from the minor the name, address, and telephone number of an adult who
may serve as an emergency contact," and then directs the provider to notify that
adult when the minor patient seeks a discharge from treatment. 207 While the statute
seeks to comply with the federal confidentiality law and regulations by providing
that "the facility shall verify the existence and availability of such contact upon
notice to and with the prior written consent of the minor,"208 no similar requirement
of written consent by the minor is included in the provision directing that the adult
contact person be notified upon the minor's application for discharge. 209 This
subsequent communication of patient-identifying information to the contact person
could constitute a violation of the federal confidentiality law, even if the minor
previously had consented to communication with that person, if the child later
withdraws his or her consent. The federal regulations generally grant patients an
ongoing right to withdraw their written consent for disclosure, except to the extent
that the treatment provider has acted in reliance on that consent. 2 o Presumably, the
treatment provider could require, as a condition of initiating treatment, that the
minor provide written consent for a future disclosure to the contact person in the
event the minor seeks discharge. In such a case, the treatment provider might argue
that the minor's subsequent revocation of consent should not be deemed to be
effective for purposes of the federal confidentiality law and regulations because the
treatment had been provided in reliance on the minor's agreement. While such a
position is not explicitly foreclosed by the language of the federal confidentiality
regulations, it does push the logic of those provisions to their limits and would not
likely prevail if tested in court.
205. Id. § 22.11(c).
206. Id § 22.11(b).
207. Id. §§ 22.11(d)(1)(iv)(B), (d)(2)(ii)(A).
208. Id. § 22.11 (d)(1)(iv)(B) (emphasis added).
209. See id § 22.11 (d)(2)(ii)(A) (stating that when a discharge request is received, the director must
immediately notify the minor's designated emergency contact person of that request, but making no
mention of consent by the minor for such disclosure).
210. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.31 (a)(8) (2010).
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B. The Confidentiality Interests ofResisting Minors in Treatment
While adolescents and other minors can obtain substance misuse treatment in
most states without the consent of their parents, the more common circumstance is
that such treatment is authorized by a minor's parents, often over the minor's
objections. 211 In these instances, it is natural for the parents who have arranged for
and consented to treatment to wish to receive ongoing information about their
child's progress in treatment, and, perhaps, even to participate in that care through
family counseling or other services directed to the family. However, under the
federal confidentiality law and regulations, the sharing of patient-identifying
information to a child's parents is still a covered disclosure, even if the parents
already know that the child is in treatment. 212 Of course, the parents may not know
the details of their child's substance use history or other sensitive information that
has emerged in counseling sessions and that has been memorialized in the
caregiver's written notes, and the minor may wish to prevent that information from
being disclosed. The law in some states addresses this question, at least in part, by
granting the parents a right to receive this information. 213 In California, for
example, "in cases where a parent or legal guardian has sought the medical care
and counseling for a drug- or alcohol-related problem of a minor child, the
physician shall disclose medical information concerning the care to the minor's
parent or legal guardian upon his or her request, even if the minor child does not
consent to disclosure, without liability for the disclosure." 214
As a formal legal matter, a treatment program's compliance with this
California statute, or with similar statutes on the books in some other states, would
constitute a violation of the federal confidentiality law and regulations, unless the
minor patient has authorized the state-mandated disclosure by executing a proper
written consent form. 215 Moreover, the federal law and regulations make clear that,
211. Muck et al., supra note 3, at 145. The authors report the following:
Motivation for treatment is a key factor in addressing adolescent substance use
because adolescents presenting for treatment almost never enter as a self-referral.
Instead, they are typically referred by a parent, juvenile justice system official (judge
or probation or parole officer), school official, child welfare worker, or representative
of some other community institution.
Id.
212. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 2.13(b) (2010) (noting that restrictions on disclosure apply even if
person seeking information already has it).
213. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(g) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102
(LexisNexis 2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-14 (2009); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2602(B) (West
2004).
214. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(g) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
215. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.31 (stating the elements required for executing a proper written consent
form). The federal confidentiality regulations do permit disclosures without consent in the case of proper
court orders issued pursuant to Subpart E of the regulations, but the substantive criteria for obtaining
such a court order ordinarily would not be satisfied in the typical case. See id. §§ 2.61-.67 (specifying
precise requirements for obtaining an authorizing court order).
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in cases of conflict between the requirements of the federal confidentiality regime
and state law requirements, the federal obligations must prevail, and the operation
of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution insures that this hierarchy of law
has force.2 16 Thus, 42 § 2.20 of the federal confidentiality regulations explicitly
provides that, while the federal provisions do not preempt all state laws in the field,
''no State law may either authorize or compel any disclosure prohibited by these
regulations." 217 But beyond the technical legal conflict between the federal law
favoring non-disclosure and state laws that seek to insure the involvement of
parents in the treatment of their children, there is a broader conflict of values and
interests that animate the legal obligations in tension. If that broader conflict could
effectively be managed, it is possible that such a process of reconciliation could
help to render the legal tension less problematic.
The values and interests served by the California law, and by similar laws in
other states mandating disclosure to parents, closely track the interests held by
parents as medical decision-makers for their children more generally. 218 As
discussed previously, adult decision-makers are likely to focus especially on "basic
interests" relating to their child's general physical, emotional and intellectual
wellbeing, and on "developmental interests" relating to their child's acquisition of
the tools he or she will need to succeed later in life. 219 Consistent with this
perspective, Chief Justice Burger's analysis in Parham cast the parents' interests as
largely derivative of those held by the child, although his opinion (and the work of
some academic commentators in this field) 2 0 suggests that parents' interests also
derive from their investment in the "family as a unit" and in the parents' stake in
their ongoing relationship with their child. 221 Presumably, each of these parental
concerns plays a role in supporting the state law disclosure obligations of treatment
providers charged with informing parents of the progress of their child's treatment
for alcohol or other drug misuse.222
216. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
217. 42 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2010).
218. See Amy L. McGuire & Courtenay R. Bruce, Keeping Children's Secrets: Confidentiality in the
Physician-Patient Relationship, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 315, 331 (2008) (describing the rights of
parents in medicial decision making).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
220. See Paul, supra note 64, at 302 (adults often value interests "on [their] children's behalf and by
those adults for their own sakes").
221. See supra text accompanying note 64. Parents have "rights on behalf of their children, as proxy
decision-makers or legal representatives," but also "as parents because of the importance of family
integrity ... or family autonomy," and rights as "those responsible for children." Paul, supra note 64, at
303.
222. Cf SCOTT B. FRIZZIE, ASSEMBLY B. 2883 ANALYSIS (Ca. May 2, 1996) (amending state law to
permit parents, who have sought medical care for their children, to access records regarding the
treatment because "[c]oncerned parents need to be able to act on behalf of their child and to make
informed decisions about their child's welfare").
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Determining the values and interests animating the strict anti-disclosure
regime in the federal confidentiality law and regulations is somewhat more
complex. Presumably, the enforcement of a rigorous legal norm of non-disclosure
that ordinarily can be overridden only by the affirmative (and written) permission
of the patient, advances important "autonomy interests." 223 Seen in this way, the
federal confidentiality rules operate to empower patients receiving substance
misuse treatment services, including adolescents in treatment, to exercise more
control over their lives, including the decision about whether private information
should be shared with family, friends and others. 224 Beyond this interest, the
rigorous requirements of non-disclosure also reflect a judgment by Congress and
federal regulators that the ongoing social stigma associated with alcohol and other
drug misuse requires special protections for individuals seeking treatment and for
the treatment system itself.225 The federal confidentiality statutes and the original
implementing regulations promulgated in the 1970s made clear that Congress was
concerned, not only about the harmful consequences that disclosure of treatment
information could cause to individuals with substance use disorders,2 26 but also that
unnecessary disclosures could damage the broader delivery system for alcohol and
other drug misuse treatment services by discouraging others from seeking
treatment. 22 7
Clearly, adolescents and other minors in need of treatment for substance use
disorders could suffer individual harm, at school and elsewhere, if their alcohol or
other drug use were broadly communicated. 22 8 And just as clearly, a regular
practice of broad disclosure could discourage others, including adolescents who
223. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
224. See Hartman, supra note 10, at 426 (noting results from a study of adolescent patients
indicating that they regard confidentiality as "the most important characteristic" in their decision to
access medical care). See generally Vukadinovich, supra note 131, at 671 (stating that in some situations
a minor may not seek services out of a concern that his or her parent will be informed of the treatment,
and in these situations the minor's autonomy interests and "physical wellbeing" must prevail).
225. See S. REP. No. 93-208, at 28 (1973) (adding a provision to the law that requires records of
patient participation in substance abuse treatment to be withheld from all persons not connected to the
treatment); id at 31 (Taft statement recognizing the importance of eliminating discrimination against
alcoholics); see also Confidentiality of Alcohol, supra note 185, at 388 & n.7 (stating that stigma
associated with substance use disorders can have a harmful impact).
226. See Confidentiality of Alcohol, supra note 185, at 388. This is especially true with respect to
those who use illegal drugs who may be exposed to criminal jeopardy, but also applies to alcohol
misuse, the disclosure of which can negatively affect an individual's employment, occupational license,
or family situation. Id.
227. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.3 (2010). In effect, the assumption was that if treatment providers adhered to
a comprehensive and rigorous confidentiality scheme persons with substance use disorders would be
more likely to seek treatment for these highly stigmatizing conditions. See generally Confidentiality of
Alcohol, supra note 185, at 388.
228. See Reginald Simmons et al., Bringing Adolescents into Substance Abuse Treatment Through
Community Outreach and Engagement: The Hartford Youth Project, 40 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGs 41, 42
(2008) (stating that young people often do not receive substance abuse treatment because they are
concerned about social stigma and embarrassment).
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might otherwise be motivated to seek help, from obtaining treatment services. 229
But the carefully controlled communication of information about a minor's
treatment to his or her parents would not seem to threaten either of these concerns.
Such a sharing of sensitive information with an adolescent's parents could,
however, undermine the minor's autonomy interests and his or her developing
sense of self control. 230
In a certain way, this conflict, between the child's autonomy interests and
the parents' interests in their child's care, is mirrored in the literature describing
effective substance misuse treatment for adolescents. 231 Indeed, two of the "key
elements for effective adolescent drug treatment" identified by a group of leading
researchers, after reviewing the literature and consulting an advisory panel of
twenty-two experts, track these competing interests closely. 232 On one side, the
experts agreed that effective treatment requires programs to "build a climate of trust
between the adolescent and the therapist." 233 The decision of a treatment provider
to share sensitive information with a minor's parents over his or her objections
certainly has the potential to diminish the child's sense of confidence in his or her
therapist's loyalty, particularly if that information was revealed in counseling
undertaken with the implied or explicit understanding that the clinician was on the
child's side. Because trust between a minor patient and his or her therapist can be
crucial in "engaging and retaining teens in treatment," 234 the threat represented by
an unconsented-to disclosure could severely damage the minor's motivation for
change. 235 In addition, it also has the potential to diminish the minor's sense of
229. See Confidentiality of Alcohol, supra note 185, at 389 (stating that the restrictive rules were
designed to insure people in need of substance abuse treatment would have safe access to treatment);
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-920, at 33 (1972) ("[F]ear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of records that
will attach for life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment .. .. ").
230. See generally Eekelaar, supra note 39, at 171 (discussing the autonomy interest held by
children). Some experts have warned that the twelve-step treatment methodology associated with
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous may be "antithetical to the developing adolescent"
because it calls on the minor to accept his or her powerlessness and to "surrender, at a time when the
adolescent is developing a personal identity and personal power. . . ." Deas & Thomas, supra note 101,
at 187.
231. See Paul, supra note 64, at 302-03 (explaining that children tend to value autonomy whereas
adults often place a higher value on their child's developmental interests); Laura Burney Nissen,
Effective Adolescent Substance Abuse Treatment in Juvenile Justice Settings: Practice and Policy
Recommendations, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT Soc. WORK J., 298, 305-06 (2006) (noting that substance
abuse treatment success depends on a variety of factors including the involvement of family and the
child's feeling of self-worth throughout the process).
232. See Brannigan et al., supra note 71, at 905 (competing interests of "family involvement in
treatment" and "retaining teens in treatment" are embodied in two of the nine elements identified by the
researchers).
233. Id
234. Id.
235. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Health Information Law in the Context of Minors, 123 PEDIATRICS
S 116, S120 (Supp. 2009) ("State and federal law have evolved to create certain health information
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control, not only over the course of his or her treatment, but also over other
fundamental day-to-day decisions.236 A primary focus of some of the leading forms
of treatment for adolescents with substance use disorders involves assisting them in
understanding that their harmful behaviors are the result of choices, that they can
develop the capacity to evaluate these choices and can exercise control over them,
and that they are responsible for the consequences of their decisions. 237 In light of
this focus on helping adolescent patients develop a more responsible disposition
toward decision making, an autonomy-reinforcing confidentiality rule that locates
authority in the individual patient to decide whether to share treatment information
(a choice that often presents the individual with a difficult mix of costs and
benefits) can be understood as advancing the larger therapeutic aims of the
program. 238
On the other side of the divide, the experts who have identified essential
criteria for the effective treatment of adolescents also stress the importance of
encouraging family involvement in treatment. 239 They cite research demonstrating
"that involving parents in the adolescent's drug treatment produces better
outcomes," 240 and other research suggesting that treatment models based on family
systems theory often produce the best rates of treatment retention and relapse
prevention. 241 A range of available treatment approaches based on family systems
or social-ecological theory are available. 242 "A family systems view of adolescent
privacy rights, particularly in the case of highly sensitive treatments whose disclosure could compromise
a minor's safety or willingness or ability to seek care.").
236. Cf Kathryn Hickey, Minors' Rights in Medical Decision Making, 9 JONA'S HEALTHCARE L.
ETHICS, & REG. 100, 101 (2007) (noting that to allow an adolescent to give assent to decisions related to
the adolescent's medical treatment promotes the feeling of empowerment).
237. This is especially the case with respect to treatment approaches based on cognitive behavioral
therapy, which focus on information processing, social learning, and problem solving. See Deas &
Thomas, supra note 101, at 183 (noting that cognitive behavioral therapy strives to make individuals
aware of, and avoid, situations that may lead to substance abuse.); see also NAT'L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIDA INFOFACTS: TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION 4
(2009), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/if treatment approaches 2009
to nida 92209.pdf (stating that cognitive-behavioral therapy aims to aid patients in identifying,
avoiding, and coping with situations that may lead to drug abuse).
238. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1291-92 (1998) (stating that, since people with substance abuse problems are also
likely to have little control over other features of their daily lives, being afforded the opportunity to
exercise control over the disclosure of treatment information may help these individuals to develop a
sense of responsibility for their own actions).
239. See, e.g., Howard A. Liddle, Family-Based Therapies for Adolescent Alcohol and Drug Use:
Research Contributions and Future Research Needs, 99 ADDICTION 76, 77 (Supp. 2 2004) (noting that
parents and guardians play a critical role in "treatment engagement and outcome," and that practice
guidelines highlight the significance of such involvement).
240. Brannigan, supra note 71, at 905.
241. See, e.g., Austin et al., supra note 102, at 68 (noting a study that found that family-based
interventions may produce more favorable results than other approaches).
242. See Ozechowski & Liddle, supra note 181, at 270-71 (noting that family-based therapies vary
based on the amount of family involvement).
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drug abuse focuses on the manner in which adolescent functioning is related to
parental, sibling, and extended-family functioning, as well as to patterns of
communication and interaction within and between various family subsystems." 243
Family-based models identify overall family functioning and individual family
relationships as playing an important role in the adolescent's development of
problematic drug use behaviors, 244 and target "a variety of familial factors,
including communication skills, contingency management, and conflict resolution,"
for therapeutic interventions. 245 Many of the techniques utilized by family
therapists require the involvement of parents and other family members. These
include "observing the interactive patterns between members by encouraging them
to speak directly to each other," helping family members to "clarify family roles
and boundaries," and "reframing or relabeling problem behavior" in order to foster
"new insights and opportunities to mend or develop relationships." 246
In some cases, state laws that either encourage or require the sharing of
information with parents may be sensible, given the assumptions underlying a
family systems approach to treating adolescents. Thus, to the extent that family
dynamics "play a role in the creation of conditions related to adolescent drug use,"
and to the extent that "parent-adolescent relationships can protect adolescents
against drug use," 247 enlisting the active assistance of parents in treatment may be a
useful approach. On the other hand, if the origins of a drug use disorder lie in
dysfunctional family relationships, or have been fostered by inappropriate or
harmful features of the adolescent's relationship with his or her parents, a less than
careful interjection of the parents into the therapeutic context could be
counterproductive. Effective treatment often requires the therapist to attend to
developmental issues, including the adolescent's ongoing work "negotiating levels
of autonomy and dependence in relation to parents and families." 248 Moreover,
harmful family dynamics may be especially pronounced in the case of some
adolescent girls with substance use disorders. "It has been suggested that drug-
abusing girls may need more attention with regard to family problems in that they
often experience severe parental rejection and sexual or physical abuse." 249 The
opportunity to work through identity issues and separation concerns in the relative
safety of a therapeutic relationship protected from overbearing or anxious parental
involvement may be a crucial component in an adolescent's earnest efforts to deal
with drug use problems. On this understanding, then, an autonomic rule in favor of
243. Id. at 270.
244. Id. (stating that a family-based model looks at individual functioning in the context of one's
family and analyzes recurring patterns of interaction).
245. Austin et al., supra note 102, at 68.
246. Muck et al., supra note 3, at 151 (emphasis omitted).
247. Deas & Thomas, supra note 101, at 179.
248. Winters, supra note 68, at 209.
249. Id. at 210.
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parental involvement could prejudge a clinical decision better left to the discretion
of individual clinicians acting in context. In the final analysis, the decision whether
(and how) to inform and involve parents in an adolescent's treatment for substance
misuse is a complex clinical judgment likely to vary from instance to instance. The
tension between state law obligations to disclose and federal law obligations to
maintain the adolescent's confidentiality are in this sense mirrored in a therapeutic
tension between the need to attend to the autonomy interests of the adolescent on
one side, and the potential advantages of family involvement on the other. 250
IV. CONCLUSION
Adolescents in need of treatment for substance use disorders or mental illness
can be involved in the decision-making process regarding their care in a number of
different ways. In some states, and for some purposes, adolescents are permitted to
act as independent decision-makers, or to have the "final say." 251 In most
circumstances, parents, juvenile justice officials, and/or other adults are accorded
the ultimate decision-making authority. 25 2 Even in these instances, however,
adolescents and other minors can still remain involved by being informed of the
available choices and their relative costs and benefits, by being invited to express a
view based upon their understanding of those options, and by being permitted to
influence the decision-maker through the expression of their preferences. 253 As one
writer has put it: "We should tell [adolescents] that their participation is important,
that their voices should be heard and their values and preferences taken into
account." 254
When the law does not permit adolescents or other minors to exercise
independent and final authority, it is crucial that parents and clinicians
communicate openly and clearly both about the child's opportunities for
participating in the decision-making process and about the limits of that
participation. 255 The adolescent or other minor should be treated with respect,
which means that his or her "preferred choices and values are [regarded as]
250. See Howard A. Liddle et al., Multidimensional Family Therapy: A Science-Based Treatment for
Adolescent Drug Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL FAMILY THERAPY 128, 134 (Jay L. Lebow ed.,
2005), available at http://iftandcs.org/Family/o20Therapy/Handbook%20of/20Clinical%20
Family/o20Therapy.pdf (noting the importance of promoting adolescent independence in individual
sessions and including the adoloscent's parents in therapy sessions).
251. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 235, at Sl16 (noting that minor children have autonomy over
certain kinds of health care decisions). This is certainly the case in most states with respect to consenting
to treatment for substance misuse. See supra text accompanying notes I16-26.
252. Paul, supra note 64, at 309. See also Nissen, supra note 231, at 301 (noting that the juvenile
justice system accounts for a majority of adolescent substance abuse treatment referrals).
253. Paul, supra note 64, at 309.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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important and may often, but not always, be decisive." 256 But respectful treatment
also means that, when the minor's preferences are not followed, he or she is helped
to understand the interests-relating to his or her wellbeing and to the wellbeing of
the family unit-that have led the adult decision-maker to a different outcome. 257
In addition to making efforts to include the minor in the decision-making
process, and communicating openly with him or her about the decision, adult
decision-makers with final authority who determine to pursue an outcome at odds
with a minor's expressed wishes should do so only under certain limited
circumstances.258 Authorizing a therapeutic intervention over the objections of an
adolescent or other minor thus should be avoided when it would produce "too little
harm-avoidance or benefit," would be "unlikely to succeed without cooperation,"
would not "respect the human dignity of the child," or would "require the child to
be physically or emotionally 'dragged to the clinic'" in a way that would "impair
family or therapeutic relationships." 25 9
When the law grants the minor the authority to decide, those legal rights
should be honored. 260 If the treatment provider determines that the child's judgment
does not further either his or her basic or developmental interests, these concerns
should become part of the therapeutic conversation. A carefully made decision
whether to consent to treatment, or to authorize the disclosure of confidential
information, may require the minor to weigh his or her options in light of the
consequences likely to result from competing choices. Sometimes the
consequences on both sides of a decision will be unattractive, as, for example,
when an adolescent who does not wish to authorize a disclosure to his or her
parents seeks treatment in a jurisdiction that requires parental consent. 261 In such
cases, the fact that the adolescent has decision-making rights does not mean that he
or she is entitled to exercise those rights in a vacuum. Moreover, even in
circumstances in which the adolescent possesses significant decision-making rights,
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 306 (noting that the minor's preferred health care decision should be followed except in
"rare" instances, but even then the decision to overrule the minor's choice should be in the minor's best
interests).
259. Id at 305.
260. Certainly, the rights accorded minors by the federal confidentiality law and regulations
governing treatment for substance misuse disorders are an important example of this. See supra text
accompanying notes 184-86; see also, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN A
NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 5. http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/healthit/
individualchoice.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (noting that a parent should not act on behalf of a child
"when State or other law does not require the consent of a parent [to] . . . obtain a particular health care
service" or a parent or guardian agrees "to a confidential relationship between the minor and ... health
care provider").
261. See supra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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the law sometimes permits the treatment provider to disregard the minor's
preferences if they pose a serious risk of harm either to the child or to others.262
With these principles in mind, we can now make some observations about
Denise and Steve, the adolescents described in the case studies set out earlier. We
know that in most states Denise's mother retains the legal right to authorize
substance misuse treatment, even over Denise's objections, although many
jurisdictions also require the independent judgment of either the treatment provider
or a judge (or both).263 It may be that Denise's basic and developmental interests
require that she receive inpatient treatment for her substance misuse disorder and
co-occurring mental disability, even though this will require a degree of coercion at
odds with her autonomy interests and potentially at odds with maintaining a
trusting therapeutic relationship with the treatment program. But whatever the
relative weight of the costs and benefits associated with this decision, it is likely
that Denise's chances for a favorable treatment outcome, as well as a healthy
relationship with her mother, will be advanced if her mother and the treatment
program are careful to undertake a decision-making process in which Denise is
informed of the factors under consideration,264 is permitted to participate by
expressing her views, and is made aware that her views will be given weight in
shaping the treatment that is authorized.
In Steve's case, it is clear that, absent Steve's written consent, the federal
confidentiality law and regulations governing substance misuse treatment prohibit
the counselors from sharing any patient-identifying information with Steve's
parents, even for purposes of involving them in family-based treatment. 265 The
262. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(c)(2)(ii) (2010) (permitting a program director to contact a minor's
parents to seek authorization to treat in circumstances where the minor lacks the capacity for rational
choice).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
264. At least to the extent that the information can be shared safely without undermining Denise's
well-being. See Paul, supra note 64, at 309 (noting that explaining the decision-making process gives the
child a sense of self-worth).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 183-92. As noted earlier, state laws governing the
disclosure of mental health treatment information often are a good deal less restrictive than those
governing substance misuse treatment. While substance misuse, like many mental disabilities, has the
potential to impair a person's capacity for effective and rational decision making, the especially
pronounced stigma associated with drug and alcohol misuse and the special concerns articulated by
policy-makers decades ago that a rigorous system of patient confidentiality is necessary to encourage
individuals, including adolescents, to seek substance misuse treatment, may be a sufficient basis for the
legally distinct treatment that continues to be accorded to persons receiving drug and alcohol treatment.
Under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191 (1996), Steve's counselors also would be more likely to have authority to share information
with his parents for purposes of involving them in his treatment for mental illness. 45 C.F.R. §§
164.502(g)(1) and (3) (2010) deal with parents, guardians, or other persons acting in loco parentis.
HIPAA approaches this as an adult serving in the capacity of a personal representative. Under § (g)(1), a
personal representative is treated as if he or she is the individual to whom the health record pertains; i.e.
stands in the patient's shoes for all use/disclosure decisions. In one respect, HIPAA provides a variation
on the approach of the federal substance misuse treatment confidentiality regulations: if the parent has
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exception in the federal regulations permitting a treatment program to contact
parents to obtain authorization for treatment when the program director determines
that the minor is incapable of making a rational choice would not apply in this
instance,2 66 because the proposed contact would not be for purposes of obtaining
parental consent for treatment (assuming these events are taking place in a state in
which minors are empowered under state law to consent to treatment on their own).
An exception in the federal regulations for medical emergencies also would not
provide a solution, both because these circumstances probably do not constitute a
medical emergency for purposes of the federal law, and because that exception only
allows disclosure to medical personnel. 267 Finally, the provisions governing court-
ordered disclosures under Subpart E of the regulations are extremely restrictive and
procedurally cumbersome. Their requirement of a judicial finding of "good cause"
to disclose would likely prevent the issuance of an authorizing court order to
contact Steve's parents, absent other more compelling circumstances. 268
authority to act on the minor's behalf for health care decisions, then the health provider is required to
treat the parent as the personal representative, resulting in disclosure to the parent. Id § (g)(3)(i). On the
other hand, the parent is not treated as a personal representative to the extent the minor has consented to
the health care and no other consent is needed, and the minor has not requested that the parent act as the
personal representative. Id. § (g)(3)(i)(A). 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) also contains a separate standard
that governs the disclosure of information about an unemancipated minor to parents who are not acting
as the personal representative. Under § 164.524, a patient generally is entitled to gain access to his or her
own records. The provision related to unemancipated minors states that to the extent state law permits or
requires disclosure of health information to a parent, the health provider may disclose that information
(which would be given to the minor under § 164.524) to the parent. Id. § (g)(3)(ii)(A). Similarly, to the
extent state law prohibits access of the minor's health information to parents, it cannot be released to the
parent under § 164.524. Id. § (g)(3)(ii)(B). If there are no provisions in state law related to parental
access to a minor's health information when the parent is not acting as a personal representative, then
the provider may provide or deny access to a parent/guardian, provided the decision is made by a
licensed care professional in the exercise of professional judgment. Id. § (g)(3)(ii)(C). A final provision
that relates to a family's access to health information is 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2010). This section deals
with disclosures of personal health information in a number of circumstances in which the patient is
informed in advance of the use or disclosure and is given the opportunity to agree to, prohibit, or restrict
the use or disclosure of protected health information. (The patient's oral agreement or objection to
use/disclose is sufficient.) One of the circumstances deals with family members who are directly
involved in the patient's care or payment related to that care. Id. § 164.510(b). The provider can disclose
information (1) directly relevant to the family member's involvement in the patient's care or payment or
(2) that informs the parent of the patient's location, general condition or death. Id. Before making either
of these disclosures, however, the provider must obtain the patient's agreement; give the patient an
opportunity to object and not get an objection; or reasonably infer that the individual does not object. Id
If the patient is deemed to be "not present" because of incapacity or an emergency situation, this section
permits disclosures that the provider considers to be in the best interest of the patient, but limits the
information to that which is directly relevant to the person's involvement in the patient's health care. Id.
§ 164.510(b)(3).
266. 42 C.F.R. § 2.14(c)(2)(ii) (2010).
267. See id. § 2.51 (noting that patient information can be disclosed to medical personnel to treat a
condition that poses an immediate threat to the patient's health and requires immediate medical
intervention).
268. See id. § 2.64(d) (noting that "good cause" exists where the court finds that other ways of
obtaining the information would be unavailable or ineffective and that the interests in disclosure
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In the end, the decision to contact Steve's parents would require the
adolescent's written consent. 269 Of course, the treatment provider could make the
provision of further counseling contingent on its receiving Steve's written
permission to contact his parents.270 In any event, Steve's exercise of his
confidentiality rights, and his plan for dealing with his father's intolerance with
respect to alcohol or drug use, ought to be an integrated part of the counseling
agenda itself. While there is considerable legal regulation of these issues at both the
federal and state level, 271 in the final analysis these questions more properly are
framed as clinical issues that require the sound judgment of treatment
professionals. Important legal obligations certainly are present, but they should not
serve as the sole basis for decision making in these cases.
outweigh the potential negative results for the patient); id. §§ 2.61-67 (outlining the procedures that
must be taken before an order may be issued).
269. See id. § 2.31(a) (outlining the requirements for written consent).
270. See, e.g., Margaret K. Brooks, Legal and Ethical Issues, in TIP 32: TREATMENT OF
ADOLESCENTS WITH SUBSTANCE ABUSE (Y-Lang Nguyen ed., 1999), available at
http.//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK26046/?report=printable/ (noting that a provider could limit the
period of the treatment for adolescents who refuse parental notification). This assumes that there is no
other state law that provides Steve with an enforceable right to receive substance misuse services. See
supra notes I16-26 and accompanying text.
27 1. See supra Part II.
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